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I. Introduction
As detectives entered the home of O.J. Simpson and as police
officers repeatedly struck Rodney King,' the nation questioned
whether these actions violated the Fourth Amendment, which protects
an individual's right to personal security.2 In both cases, officers as-
serted that their actions were reasonably based on their objective as-
sessment of danger: providing aid to possible victims in Mr. Simpson's
home and protecting themselves from a disobedient suspect. Resolu-
tion of these Fourth Amendment issues centered on how to assess
danger to police officers and the community, with little consideration
given to the right to personal security and privacy.
When police officers attempt to control suspects during arrests,
they must exercise only reasonable force, because the Fourth Amend-
ment provides that individuals have a right "to be secure in their per-
sons.., against unreasonable... seizures."3 Officers must also act
reasonably when they render aid to victims4 or frisk suspects.5 In
evaluating the use of force, the United States Supreme Court has
stated that reasonableness is an objective standard. In Tennessee v.
Garner,6 the Court addressed the issue of deadly force. The Court
held that "if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is
probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the
infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly
force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasi-
ble, some warning has been given."7 In applying this standard to the
use of nondeadly force, the Court in Graham v. Connor8 articulated
three factors that determine whether force was reasonable: (1) "the
severity of the crime;" (2) "whether the suspect poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others;" and (3) "whether he is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight."9
1. JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE Ex-
CESSIVE USE OF FORCE 16 (1993) ("Mistrust and hostility predictably follow upon abuse
and repression.").
2. The Fourth Amendment provides in part that "[t]he right of the people to be se-
cure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 153-161, 425-462.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 81-148, 367-405.
6. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). For a discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes
27-69.
7. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12.
8. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
9. 1&. at 396.
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Although these decisions provide some guidelines for determining
reasonable force, many courts have drastically limited the Fourth
Amendment right to personal security by determining that the pres-
ence of danger automatically justifies both aggressive and preventive
actions.
As a result of this interpretation of the Reasonableness Clause,
courts have misperceived how to assess reasonableness. Too often the
presence of any danger results in the court's failure to perceive other
significant issues for resolving whether the conduct was reasonable:
whether police officers created the need to use force; whether police
officers should have used less intrusive means to apprehend a suspect;
whether the Fourth Amendment, under some circumstances, man-
dates that police officers let suspects flee rather than use ever-increas-
ing amounts of nonlethal force; whether juries are necessary to
determine the reasonableness of a police practice; and whether police
officers' actions before a seizure are relevant to the reasonableness
inquiry. The courts should consider the presence of danger when they
determine reasonableness; however, courts often erroneously assess
the degree of danger by strongly deferring to the judgment of police
officers. These serious misperceptions significantly diminish the
Fourth Amendment right to personal security.
Because the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard is an
abstract standard, some guidelines are necessary to aid courts in dis-
cerning the balancing process of the Fourth Amendment. Without
guidelines, the reasonableness standard may become more rule-like, 10
with courts continuing to create legal fictions" and automatic pre-
sumptions of constitutionality.'2 These guidelines must take into ac-
count the history of the Fourth Amendment, particularly the fear of
an unchecked constabulary. As Professor Tracey Maclin has stated:
"The constitutional lodestar for understanding the Fourth Amend-
ment is not an ad hoc reasonableness standard; rather, the central
10. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Forward" The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. Rn-v. 22,56-69 (1992). Professor Kathleen Sullivan has stated that a rule "binds
a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering
facts.... A rule necessarily captures the background principle or policy incompletely and
so produces errors of over- or under-inclusiveness." Id. at 58. A standard, however, "al-
low[s] the decisionmaker to take into account all relevant factors or the totality of circum-
stances." Id. at 59. It thus has fewer problems with over- or under-inclusiveness. Id. at 58.
See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943, 946 (1987) (balancing includes both weighing competing interests and dis-
cerning the presence of "'compelling' or 'important' state interests").
11. See infra text accompanying notes 463-475.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 216-260.
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meaning of the Fourth Amendment is distrust of police power and
discretion."' 3 However, when assessing the danger posed by suspects,
courts have strongly deferred to the judgment of police officers and
have not seriously questioned the need for force.14 Were courts to
consider the historical distrust of police power when reviewing reason-
able force claims, one would expect less deference to police judgment
and more concern for an individual's interest in personal security.
When courts evaluate whether the police used reasonable force, they
should consider whether alternatives were available to the police of-
ficers, instead of rubber-stamping their actions. By closely scrutiniz-
ing the judgment of police officers, courts would limit the types of
conduct that establish a reasonable belief that a suspect poses a dan-
ger to police officers and the community. A likely by-product of such
an approach would be improved municipal training of police officers
in using devices to restrain subjects. 15
Rather than articulate an evolving standard of reasonableness,
many courts erroneously use danger as a proxy for reasonableness and
have defined danger too broadly.' 6 The lack of scrutiny is clear when
13. Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 197, 201 (1993). See also Kopf v. Skyrm, 993 F.2d 374, 379 (4th Cir. 1993). In
Kopf, the Fourth Circuit declared that history of the Fourth Amendment supports a rob-
ber's right not to be subject to unreasonable force during his arrest:
[The robber] was a criminal. He deserved to be arrested and punished; his story
stirs little sympathy, much less outrage, in the crowd. The courts cannot be so
impassive. We must always remember that unreasonable searches and seizures
helped drive our forefathers to revolution. One who would defend the Fourth
Amendment must share his foxhole with scoundrels of every sort, but to abandon
the post because of the poor company is to sell freedom cheaply.
Id. at 379-80. The Fourth Circuit added, "'[W]hile we are concerned here with a shabby
defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes of
the Fourth Amendment."' Id. at 380 (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
14. See Maclin, supra note 13, at 200 ("If the Court can identify any plausible goal or
reason that promotes law enforcement interests, the challenged police practice is consid-
ered reasonable and the constitutional inquiry is over.").
15. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989) (a municipality
can be liable for its failure to train officers as to the constitutional limits on the use of
deadly force).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Bold, 19 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1994) (used statistics re-
garding the likelihood of gun possession by New York City residents to justify a frisk of an
individual); United States v. Villanueva, 15 F.3d 197, 199 (1st Cir. 1994) (upheld frisk of
disorderly youths because they had baggy clothing and may have been "emboldened" by
the presence of a gun); Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774,780 (4th Cir. 1993) (did not consider
whether officer created need for force); Kruegher v. Fuhr, 991 F.2d 435 (8th Cir. 1993) (did
not allow jury to determine whether suspect made a dangerous furtive gesture); United
States v. Michelletti, 991 F.2d 183, 184-85 (5th Cir. 1993) (upheld frisk because suspect
allegedly had hand in his pocket, had been drinking, and had a "cocky attitude"); United
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courts permit police officers to frisk suspects for weapons.' 7 Courts
readily uphold frisks as preventive measures.18 However, the degree
of danger justifying a preventive measure, such as frisking, should not
necessarily justify an aggressive measure, such as a shooting, because
of the weighty interest in bodily integrity. Under the doctrine of fur-
tive gestures, many courts have held that the same degree of danger
justified both a frisk and a shooting.' 9 In short, many courts, without
considering other important issues, have erroneously held that officers
could kill a suspect because the suspect moved after an order to
freeze.20
This Article asserts that danger is not the only factor to consider
in determining whether a police practice is unconstitutional. Other
factors should affect the balancing process of the Fourth Amendment.
The goal of this Article is to highlight the misperceptions of the
Fourth Amendment. One common misperception is that the assess-
ment of danger is the same as the assessment of reasonableness. Part
II reveals that in both Garner and Graham danger was only a factor in
determining the constitutionality of force during investigations and ar-
rests. Part III shows that when police officers act preventively rather
than aggressively, the presence of danger more readily justifies intru-
sive police action. This part examines the common practice of frisking
suspects, in which police officers pat down the outer garments of sus-
pects if they have reasonable suspicion to believe that the suspects
may be "armed and dangerous."'" Other common preventive prac-
tices include emergency searches and searches incident to arrests.
Part IV demonstrates that danger is a factor in determining the consti-
tutionality of both aggressive and preventive actions. Part V details
the conflict in the lower courts as to how to measure reasonableness
when officers act aggressively. The disagreement has centered on five
important issues: what evidence is relevant, who decides whether con-
duct was reasonable, the significance of the offense allegedly commit-
ted by the suspect, the suspect's actions, and the availability of less
intrusive alternatives. How courts resolve these issues depends upon
how they analyze the presence of danger. Those that find danger to
States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1575 (5th Cir. 1992) (upheld a frisk of an intoxicated
suspect because a step back away from the officer signified that he might have been reach-
ing for a gun).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 365-425.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 365-425.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 274-288, 387-390.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 216, 281-287.
21. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
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be a weighty factor give little consideration to the other issues. Those
that properly perceive the significance of danger are more likely to
evaluate other factors. Part VI reveals that lower courts defer to of-
ficers' assertions of danger when the officers act preventively. Part
VII discusses the lower courts' misperception of the Fourth Amend-
ment and the results of that misperception: officers may frisk suspects
for weapons upon mere suspicion, officers may use extremely intru-
sive means for conducting stops if drugs are involved, officers may
view "emergencies" as opportunities for investigative searches, and
officers may search an area incident to an arrest even if the suspect
did not have access to that area at the time of the search.
To properly safeguard Fourth Amendment rights, Part VIII offers
specific guidelines to assess the presence of danger and the constitu-
tionality of both aggressive and preventive actions. These guidelines
check the unnecessary deference courts give to police officers and
compel courts to examine their serious misperceptions of the Fourth
Amendment right to personal security.
The debate between Justices Stevens and Kennedy in Maryland v.
Buie22 captures the essence of the courts' misperceptions of the
Fourth Amendment. Justice Stevens thought a police officer was fool-
ish for searching a basement of a home after the resident of the home
was arrested for armed robbery and taken outside.23 Justice Kennedy
thought the search of the basement represented good police work be-
cause a second person or accomplice might have been hiding in the
basement.24 To Justice Stevens, the mere fear of danger lurking in an
unknown basement did not justify continuation of the search, because
the officers had fulfilled the purpose of their entry-they had arrested
the suspect. To Justice Kennedy, further intrusion was permissible be-
cause some danger was present. Even though Justice Kennedy's per-
spective is consistent with the trend in the lower courts, Justice
Stevens' assessment of danger properly highlights the need to balance
a variety of interests. Justice Stevens questioned whether the officers
created the danger by descending the basement stairs. 5 He also rec-
ognized that the officers could have exercised alternatives to minimize
any potential danger.26 Because of the strong privacy interest in the
home, and because the officers could have exercised alternative meas-
22. 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
23. Id. at 337-38 (Stevens, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 339 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 338 (Stevens, J., concurring).
26. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
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ures to reduce the danger, Justice Stevens gave less consideration to
the presence of danger. Justice Stevens' perspective highlights the is-
sues explored in this Article. This Article demonstrates that one's
view of danger in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence significantly af-
fects the balance of interests.
H. The Use of Physical Force to Seize Suspects:
Aggressive Actions
For years, suspects have alleged that police officers use excessive
force during arrests. It was not until 1985, however, that the United
States Supreme Court interpreted these claims as implicating the
Fourth Amendment, which prohibits "unreasonable" seizures.27 In
two decisions, Tennessee v. Garner2 and Graham v. Connor,29 the
Supreme Court created a standard of analysis under the Fourth
Amendment for claims involving both deadly and nondeadly force.
The text and history of the Fourth Amendment were central to the
Court's decisions.3 In both decisions, the Court assessed the amount
of danger a suspect posed to police and the community.3'
In Garner, determining reasonableness required balancing a vari-
ety of interests: the right to personal security (which protects both the
suspect and society from unreasonably intrusive police practices), so-
ciety's interest in a fair adjudication of guilt, and society's interest in
effective law enforcement.3 2 Assessing danger required the Court to
evaluate the offense allegedly committed by the suspect.33 The Court
measured the degree of danger to determine whether the danger out-
weighed the suspect's "fundamental interest in his own life."' a The
police could only use deadly force if the danger was significant.35 In
applying the balancing standard under the Fourth Amendment, the
Court strongly emphasized the nature of the offense the suspect alleg-
edly committed.
The Court's assessment of danger in Garner led to the conclusion
that the police officer used unreasonable force in shooting a fleeing
27. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985).
28. Id.
29. 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989).
30. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394-97; Garner, 471 U.S. at 8-15.
31. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Garner, 471 U.S. at 10-11.
32. Garner, 471 U.S. at 9-10.
33. Id. at 11.
34. Id. at 9.
35. Iat
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suspect.36 In Garner, the police officer had probable cause to believe
that a person running from a house at night had just attempted to
burglarize the house.37 The police officer, who did not believe the sus-
pect was armed, ordered the suspect to halt.38 When the suspect
failed to follow the order, the officer shot the suspect in the back of
the head.39 A state statute authorized the use of deadly force to shoot
any fleeing felon.4° The Supreme Court held the statute was unconsti-
tutional as applied because not all fleeing felons are dangerous.4'
To justify the use of deadly force, the suspect's offense must cre-
ate a significant degree of danger, in order to outweigh the suspect's
fundamental interest in life. In describing the seriousness of the of-
fense, the Court appeared to create both a "standard" and a "rule:" 42
Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect
poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to
others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape
by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer
with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has
committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened inflic-
tion of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if neces-
sary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has
been given.43
The first sentence contains a standard: police officers may kill a sus-
pect when the suspect seriously endangers the lives of officers or
others. This standard considers all of the circumstances at the time of
the shooting. The second sentence, however, suggests a rule to deter-
mine the requisite danger: when suspects commit a certain type of of-
fense, they automatically pose a danger to the officers or the
community. Noticeably absent from the rule in the second sentence is
a reference to immediate danger to officers or others. The literal lan-
guage of the second part seems to suggest a mandatory presumption
of danger for heinous offenses: until the person is caught, everyone is
in danger. Thus, if a suspect commits an offense involving the inflic-
tion of serious bodily harm, officers may shoot him even if neither the
officers nor the public is in immediate danger.44 Such an interpreta-
36. Id at 21.
37. Id. at 3-4.
38. Id. at 4.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 4-5.
41. Id. at 20-21.
42. See Sullivan, supra note 10.
43. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12.
44. See John C. Hall, Use of Deadly Force to Prevent Escape, FBI L. BULL, Mar. 1994,
at 27, 31 (Once suspect has committed an offense involving the infliction of serious bodily
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tion, however, is inconsistent with the standard stated in Garner,
which makes a logical distinction between actual danger and possible
danger. A standard may include a non-mandatory presumption, be-
cause such a presumption still allows consideration of all the sur-
rounding circumstances, the essential feature of a standard.45
Immediacy should be considered in calculating reasonableness.
Under this standard, police officers must explain how they or others
were in danger at the time of the shooting. This interpretation is con-
sistent with a statement made in Garner: "Where the suspect poses no
immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm re-
sulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of
deadly force to do so. ''46 Read in context, some offenses may signify
danger, but the degree of danger is determined by the surrounding
circumstances.
In assessing danger, the Court examined the history of the Fourth
Amendment.47 At common law, police officers were permitted to
shoot fleeing felons.48 The Court, however, refused to interpret the
Fourth Amendment as allowing police officers to kill fleeing felons
because modem felonies are significantly different from felonies at
common law, which generally allowed capital punishment upon con-
viction.49 Instead, the Court adapted the common law rule to modem
times by requiring a relationship between the alleged offense and the
degree of danger to the community.50 It also updated the common
law by creating a standard, not a rule, for evaluating force.
In considering the history of the Fourth Amendment, the Court
discussed the type of weapons available to police officers at common
law.51 It observed that at that time officers had "rudimentary" weap-
ons, did not carry handguns "until the latter half of the last century,"
and engaged in "hand-to-hand" struggles.52 Applying the common
harm, police officers do not need "to calculate the 'probability' of future danger if the
suspects were permitted to escape.").
45. Sullivan, supra note 10, at 61 ("[D]istinctions between rules and standards, catego-
rization and balancing, mark a continuum, not a divide. A rule may be corrupted by ex-
ceptions to the point where it resembles a standard; likewise, a standard may attach such
fixed weights to the multiple factors it considers that it resembles a rule.").
46. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 12-15.
48. Id at 12.
49. Id. at 13 n.1 1 (Although "[n]ot all felonies were always punishable by death ... the
link was profound.").
50. Id at 11.
51. Id. at 14-15.
52. Garner, 471 U.S. at 14-15.
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law rule regarding shooting suspects to modern times would ignore
significant "technological" changes.53
Thus, to determine the reasonableness of a shooting under the
Fourth Amendment, a court must consider whether a suspect is dan-
gerous. The Court noted that assessing dangerousness is difficult, yet
it justified this requirement by stating that "similarly difficult judg-
ments must be made by the police in equally uncertain
circumstances." 54
In light of the difficulty in determining dangerousness, it is not
surprising that the Court was divided on the issue of whether the flee-
ing nighttime burglary suspect was a danger to the officer or the com-
munity. In her dissent, Justice O'Connor thought the offense satisfied
the requisite danger.55 She also interpreted the reasonableness stan-
dard of the Fourth Amendment as requiring a suspect to comply with
an officer's command. She stated, "to avoid the use of deadly force
and the consequent risk to his life, the suspect need merely obey the
valid order to halt."' 56 In short, she thought the way to preserve a
suspect's right to personal security was to require compliance with an
officer's order. She also criticized the majority for considering
whether officers may use deadly force, rather than limiting their anal-
ysis to whether officers may use handguns.5 7 She wondered how of-
ficers are to know when a suspect is using a potentially lethal object.
She questioned the limits on the use of knives, baseball bats, and
ropes.58 In addition, she emphasized the importance of deferring to
the judgment of police officers who have to make split-second
decisions.59
Dangerousness is also a factor when evaluating the use of
nondeadly force. In Graham v. Connor,60 the Supreme Court ex-
plained that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard de-
scribed in Garner also applied to the use of nondeadly force. After
noting the balancing of interests required by the Reasonableness
Clause, the Court attempted to provide some factors to consider in
determining reasonableness: "the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of officers
53. Id. at 15.
54. Id. at 20.
55. Id. at 26-28 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
59. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
60. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394-95.
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or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to
evade arrest by flight."' 6 1 The Court, however, did not explain how to
weigh these factors. Although the Garner decision stated that the sus-
pect has a fundamental interest in his life,62 the Graham Court did not
explain the importance of a suspect's interest in personal security
when police officers use nondeadly force. Yet, in examining the three
factors discussed in Graham, it is easy to discern their derivation from
Garner. In Garner, the Court considered the same factors articulated
in Graham: the seriousness of the offense of burglary, the immediacy
of danger to the police officer and the community, and the need to
capture the fleeing felon.
In providing some guidelines for the use of nondeadly force, the
Graham Court emphasized that the force police officers may use in
apprehending suspects is governed by the word "reasonable, ' 63 while
the force prison officials may use is governed by the words "cruel" and
"[unusual] punishments. '64 Although prison officials are liable for the
use of force only if they act maliciously, the Graham Court explained
that police officers may violate the Fourth Amendment even if they
act in subjective good faith.65 A reasonableness standard provides
greater protection to suspects because it limits the amount of force
police officers can use based on objective factors.
However, in articulating this protective standard, the Court ex-
plained that the standard should be applied with consideration for the
split-second decisions that police officers have to make.66 Within that
parameter, however, the Court emphasized that even split-second de-
cisions must be reasonable and not made merely in subjective good-
faith. Specifically, the Court held that it will evaluate the officer's de-
cision to use force from the perspective of "a reasonable police officer
on the scene."'67
The Garner and Graham decisions thus provide only general
guidelines as to how to measure reasonableness. An important factor
in these guidelines is the danger created by a suspect. If an officer
reasonably perceives the requisite immediate danger, the officer may
aggressively apprehend the suspect to protect police officers and soci-
ety because the need to apprehend the suspect outweighs the suspect's
61. Id. at 396.
62. Garner, 471 U.S. at 9.
63. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395-96.
64. Id. at 398 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)).
65. Id. at 397-98.
66. Id. at 397.
67. Id. at 396.
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right to bodily integrity. In recognizing the danger officers face in
their work, the Court in both Gamer and Graham noted that it had
previously allowed officers to conduct a limited search of suspects dur-
ing investigations in Terry v. Ohio.68 Since the Court upheld the pre-
ventive police practice in Terry and its companion case of Sibron v.
New York,69 the Court has similarly considered the presence of danger
in upholding numerous other preventive actions by police officers.7 °
H. Frisking Suspects for Weapons: Preventive Actions
The need to protect police officers and innocent bystanders from
danger is one factor courts use when determining the constitutionality
of preventive police practices. These practices include searching a sus-
pect,71 conducting a protective sweep of an area,72 ordering a suspect
out of a vehicle, 73 taking a suspect to the police station,74 taking inven-
tory of the contents of a vehicle,75 and even testing for illegal drugs.76
When police officers decide to frisk a suspect, however, danger is the
only factor courts consider.77 In evaluating other police practices, the
Supreme Court considered the government's justification for an intru-
sion.78 Terry v. Ohio79 and Sibron v. New York80 established the sig-
nificance of danger and its justification for intrusive police conduct.
Since these decisions, danger has been an important factor in uphold-
ing numerous police practices.
A. Danger as the Justification for a Terry Frisk
In Terry and Sibron, the Court approved investigatory stops and
limited searches under some circumstances. If police officers have
reasonable suspicion to believe that a suspect is armed and dangerous,
68. 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).
69. 392 U.S. 40, 64-65 (1968).
70. See infra text accompanying notes 153-169.
71. See infra text accompanying notes 81-130.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 131-148.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 419-420.
74. See infra text accompanying notes 163-169.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 158-161.
76. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672 (1989)
(suspicionless urine testing of customs agents who carry firearms is reasonable; employees
must be able to properly exercise "judgment and dexterity").
77. See infra text accompanying notes 81-85.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 43-65 and infra text accompanying notes 150-
169.
79. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25.
80. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 64-65.
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they may conduct a "frisk."8' This search allows officers to pat down
a suspect's clothing, and, if they feel an object that may be a weapon,
to search further.82 This preventive action allows police officers to
investigate crimes without jeopardizing their safety or the commu-
nity's safety. The Terry Court determined that the presence of danger
in these circumstances outweighed an individual's interest in personal
security under the Fourth Amendment. 3
The Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment to allow police of-
ficers to seize and search suspects even if they did not have probable
cause to arrest them. 4 Although the language of the amendment only
refers to probable cause for warrants, the Court determined officers
may stop someone if they have a reasonable suspicion a crime is about
to occur, and may search a suspect if they have a reasonable suspicion
the suspect is "armed and presently dangerous."85 The Court explic-
itly linked the officer's. ability to frisk to the officer's reasonable per-
ception of danger.
In both Terry86 and Sibron87 the Court considered the criminal
nature of the suspect's activity as a factor in assessing the danger the
suspect posed to the investigating officer. In Terry, an officer thought
men were about to burglarize a store because he saw them repeatedly
walk near a particular store.88 In Sibron, the officer thought a suspect
was buying drugs because he had spoken with drug addicts.89 In addi-
tion to considering the alleged offense, the Court in both cases also
considered whether the suspect's actions during the confrontation
with the officer reasonably heightened the officer's sense of danger.
In Terry, when the plain clothes officer approached the suspects, he
identified himself as a police officer and asked them their names.
When they "mumbled" a response, the officer grabbed one of the sus-
pects and frisked him.90 At this point, the officer reasonably thought
81. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24.
82. Id. at 29. The Terry Court implies that the intrusion is to be incremental, with
reasonable suspicion that the suspect may be armed and dangerous justifying each intru-
sion. Id. at 29-30. Frisks, which include touching the chest and groin areas, may be "an-
noying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience[s]." Id. at 25.
83. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
84. Id. at 24.
85. Id. at 30-31.
86. Id. at 30.
87. 392 U.S. at 62.
88. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
89. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 62.
90. Terry, 392 U.S. at 7.
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he was in danger and thus, a frisk was permissible.91 In Sibron, how-
ever, the suspect's action of reaching into his pocket did not increase
the sense of danger.92 The Court held that the frisk in Sibron was
unreasonable.93 In contrast to the frisk in Terry, which was to protect
the officer and others in the area,94 the frisk in Sibron was conducted
to gather evidence. The Court noted the officer did not specify any
facts from which he could "reasonably infer[ ] that the individual was
armed and dangerous."95 The suspect did not lose his right to personal
security merely because he spoke with drug addicts.96 The Court
stated, "the suspect's mere act of talking with a number of known nar-
cotics addicts over an eight-hour period no more gives rise to reason-
able fear of life or limb on the part of the police officer than it justifies
an arrest for committing a crime. '9 7
Although the language of the Fourth Amendment does not refer
to frisks or reasonable suspicion, the Court believed that the Reasona-
bleness Clause of the Fourth Amendment allowed frisks in some cir-
cumstances. Its rationale was built on a theory of exigent
circumstances, with the frisk permissible based on reasonable suspi-
cion, not probable cause.98 It explained that police officers, who often
do not have probable cause to arrest a suspect, still have a duty to
investigate a crime that is about to occur.99 The purpose of the stop is
to dispel the officer's reasonable suspicion that a crime is about to
occur. 100 If such an investigation is necessary, police officers should
not put themselves in unnecessary danger. The Court declared that
91. Id. at 7. The officer thought he felt a gun and later reached inside the suspect's
pocket and removed it. Id.
92. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 45. When the officer approached the suspect and stated, "You
know what I am after," the suspect "mumbled something and reached into his pocket." Id.
The officer "simultaneously" put his hand in the pocket. Id.
93. Id. at 64-65.
94. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
95. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 64. Although the Court seemed to rely on the subjective belief
of the officer that the suspect was not reaching for illegal drugs, the Court nevertheless
reiterated the objective standard that it had established in Terry. Id.
96. Id. at 64. In the alternative, the Court noted that even if the officer had had rea-
sonable suspicion to believe that the suspect was armed, the officer would have violated
Terry by failing to first pat down the outer clothing of the suspect. Id. at 65-66. By thrust-
ing his hand directly into the suspect's pocket, the officer acted unreasonably. Id.
97. Id. The Supreme Court explicitly rejected finding danger based on being part of a
group. Id. at 65.
98. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-24.
99. Id. at 24-25.
100. Id. at 30.
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the presence of danger outweighed an individual's right to personal
security.101
The balancing process for frisks resembles the balancing process
in Tennessee v. Garner'1 2 and Graham v. Connor,0 3 except that signif-
icantly greater protection attaches to the right to personal security
when officers act aggressively. Although the suspects in both Terry
and Garner were allegedly engaged in a burglary, the preventive ac-
tion in Terry was reasonable to diffuse potential danger from an im-
pending burglary, while the aggressive action in Garner was
unreasonable because the officer shot the suspect to stop him from
fleeing the scene of the crime.
In upholding the need for preventive frisks, the Terry Court did
not completely diminish the right to personal security. It stated that a
frisk is a "serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person." 4 In
evaluating an individual's right to personal security, the Court recog-
nized that the practice of stopping and frisking suspects may severely
undermine respect for the police if they use this practice to harass
youths and minorities. 05
Despite the strong interests in the right to personal security and
the freedom from harassment, the Court nevertheless approved of
frisks when officers have reasonable suspicion to believe that a suspect
is dangerous. 0 6 The Terry Court cited the problem of violence in
America as a justification for its holding:
Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police of-
ficers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.
American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and
every year in this country many law enforcement officers are
killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are wounded.
Virtually all of these deaths and a substantial portion of the inju-
ries are inflicted with guns and knives.' 07
In balancing the interests, the Court linked the analysis of reasonable-
ness to the analysis of danger posed by a suspect. The Terry Court
found that sufficient danger was present because the officer had rea-
101. Id. at 23.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 32-59.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 60-67.
104. Terry, 392 U.S. at 17. The Court noted that a frisk may include a touching of a
person's "'arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and
entire surface of the legs down to the feet."' Id. at 17 (quoting Priar and Martin, Searching
and Disarming Criminals, 45 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 481 (1954)).
105. Terry, 392 U.S. at 14-15 n.11.
106. Id. at 27.
107. Id. at 23-24.
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sonable suspicion to believe that the suspects were about to burglarize
a store.108 The Court stated that a Terry frisk may be "designed to
discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the as-
sault of the police officer.' 10 9
The suspect's alleged offense and the suspect's actions are factors
to consider in determining whether a frisk is reasonable. In upholding
the frisk in Terry and finding the frisk in Sibron unlawful, the Court
aptly noted that the reasonableness of any frisk depends upon the
facts of a particular case." 0 Although the Terry Court limited its hold-
ing to the facts of the case,"' the Court analyzed the facts of other
cases to determine whether the circumstances justified preventive
frisks.
B. The Progeny of Terry
The progeny of Terry reveal that only a reasonable perception of
danger justifies a frisk. Several decisions have discussed frisks associ-
ated with illegal drug activity: Minnesota v. Dickerson"2 refused to
extend Terry frisks to drug searches; Ybarra v. Illinois1 3 prohibited
police officers from frisking bar patrons when the officers executed a
warrant to search the bar for drugs; and Adams v. Williams1 4 sug-
gested that even when the alleged offense is possession of drugs, other
circumstances may nevertheless support an officer's decision to frisk a
suspect based on a reasonable perception of danger. These decisions
reveal that the mere presence of drug activity does not justify search-
ing individuals for weapons or drugs.
In Dickerson, the Supreme Court refused to extend the scope of a
frisk to include a search for drugs. 1 5 The Court affirmed that a Terry
frisk must be "strictly 'limited to that which is necessary for the dis-
covery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others
nearby.""' 6 However, officers could search suspects for drugs if, after
doing a pat down, their sense of touch gave them probable cause to
believe the suspect carried illegal drugs.117 By limiting the Terry frisk
108. Id. at 28.
109. Id. at 29.
110. Id. ("These limitations will have to be developed in the concrete factual circum-
stances of individual cases.").
111. Id. at 30.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 115-117.
113. See infra text accompanying notes 118-123.
114. See infra notes accompanying text 124-130.
115. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2138-39 (1993).
116. Id. at 2136 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968)).
117. Id. at 2137.
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to a search for weapons, the Court barred further encroachment into
an individual's right to personal security.
The difficulty of assessing danger was discussed in Ybarra v. Illi-
nois,118 a decision in which a majority of the Court refused to accept
the dissent's bright-line rule.119 This rule provides that when officers
are executing search warrants for drugs in a public place, officers may
frisk the people present because guns are "'tools of the trade""..20 of
drug dealers and buyers. The majority reiterated that individualized
suspicion is the standard for Terry frisks. It refused to assume that
individuals present during the execution of a search warrant were
likely to be armed or that the presence of a group automatically en-
dangered the officers. 12  The dissent, however, believed that a
"group" danger theory was valid because the officers were looking at
the search area and not the people present.' 22 In finding the frisk of a
bar patron unreasonable, the Court noted that neither the customers'
actions nor their attire created a sense of danger.123
Although the presence of drugs in Ybarra did not automatically
signify danger, other offenses can. In Adams v. Williams, 24 the Court
upheld a frisk of a suspect based on a tip that a person in the suspect's
car had both a gun and some drugs. 2 The Court held the stop and
the frisk was justifiable because the officer had probable cause to be-
lieve the suspect did not have a permit for his gun.' 26 The Court's
assessment of danger,127 however, ignored one important fact-state
118. 444 U.S. 85, 94-96 (1979).
119. Id. at 92-93.
120. Id. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45,
62 (2d Cir. 1977)).
121. Id. at 92-93. The police officers had a warrant to search a bar and the bartender.
It did not authorize them to search the bar's patrons. Even though the bar was associated
with illegal drugs and twelve customers filled the small search area, the Court refused
allow a general search for weapons. Id. at 90-92.
122. Id. at 106-07 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that executing
search warrants creates more danger than investigating crimes. Id. at 107.
123. Id. at 93. The patron wore a large jacket, which could conceal weapons. The
Court did not interpret the presence of baggy clothing as creating a need for a frisk. Id.
124. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
125. Id. at 147-49.
126. Id. at 148.
127. Id. at 148. The facts of Adams reveal the complexities in assessing danger. At
2:15 a.m. an informant walked up to a police officer in his cruiser and told him that a man
in a nearby car was carrying a gun at his waist and had drugs. Id. at 144-45. In this high
crime area, the officer walked over to the car and tapped on the window, asking the driver
to open the door. Id. at 145. When the suspect rolled down the window instead of opening
the door, the officer reached inside the car, relying on an informant's tip that a gun was at
the suspect's waist. Id. The officer took the gun, even though it was not visible when he
saw the suspect. Id. Unlike the stop in Terry, the officer did not ask any questions to
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law permitted citizens to carry weapons provided they were li-
censed.'28 In determining the requisite danger for a frisk, the Court
seemed to rely upon the officer's mere suspicion that the driver had a
weapon in a high-crime area at night. The dissent, however, did not
believe the suspect's mere possession of a gun signified danger.'2 9
The dissent suggested that if gun control were necessary, the Court
should "water down the Second rather than the Fourth Amend-
ment.' 130 However, the majority's assessment of danger prevailed, in-
dicating the Court's strong concern for officer protection and minimal
interest in a citizen's right to personal security.
The Court's heightened concern for police protection compelled
it to expand the scope of a frisk to include a search of the area near a
suspect. The constitutionality of this expanded search was determined
by the same standard required for the frisk of a person: reasonable
suspicion that the officer was in danger. In Michigan v. Long,'3 ' the
Court permitted officers to "frisk" the passenger compartment of a
car,132 and in Maryland v. Buie,33 the Court allowed officers to con-
duct a protective "sweep" of an area while executing a warrant.
Although the Long Court recognized that danger is present dur-
ing all traffic stops, 134 such danger did not justify searching the vehi-
cles of all suspects. The Court stated that the circumstances must
dispel his suspicion. Id. Three factors were significant for the Court: the high-crime area,
the suspect's failure to follow the officer's command, and the informant's tip that the sus-
pect had a gun and some drugs. Id. at 147-49. The need for the frisk, according to the
Court, did not arise simply because there was reasonable suspicion to believe that the
suspect was involved in drugs. Id. at 148. The car's ability to block the officer's view of the
suspect, according to the Court, created a "greater" threat to the officer's safety. Id.
128. Adams, 407 U.S. at 149-50 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting). In another dissent, Justice Marshall perceived the
majority as treating warrantless searches as the "rule rather than [as a] 'narrowly drawn'
exception." Id. at 154 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 151 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
131. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
132. Id. at 1050. In Long, the search of the passenger compartment occurred when an
officer saw a large knife on the floor during a traffic stop. Id. The officer then frisked the
suspect and searched the compartment. Id. The search was not limited to objects in plain
view; it included opening containers. Id. at 1036. The officer in Long lifted an armrest,
saw an open pouch, and found marijuana. Id. The Court upheld the search of the vehicle,
finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to perceive danger. Id. at 1050.
133. 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
134. Id. at 1047-48. The Court had previously recognized the danger inherent in traffic
stops in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977). In Mhnnms the Court declared
that police officers who lawfully stop drivers may order them out of the vehicle without any
level of suspicion of danger. Id. at 111. The Court held that the intrusion on the driver's
liberty was de minimis and the officers' interest in safety was significant. Id.
642 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:623
create a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is dangerous. 3 ' In
short, it found no automatic right to search cars when the driver is
charged with a traffic offense.
For an officer to lawfully search the passenger compartment, the
facts must signify danger. In Long, the danger existed, according to
the majority, because the officer saw a knife on the floor of the car.' 36
The presence of this weapon gave the investigating officer the author-
ity to search containers in the vehicle. 37 Although other facts also
heightened the officer's perception of danger,138 the Court placed spe-
cial emphasis on the large hunting knife.139
The Court was divided on how to accurately measure the level of
danger. The majority refused to evaluate closely whether the officer
could have used other means to protect himself.140 The dissent did
analyze this factor, however, and concluded the officer could have
protected himself by keeping the driver outside the car. 4' The officer
could then safely enter the car.' 42 The dissent added that interpreting
these circumstances as constituting danger 43 and by failing to scruti-
nize the means used the majority did "violence to the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment." 44
135. Long, 463 U.S. at 1049 n.14.
136. Id. at 1050.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1035-37. The Court offered a lengthy description of the facts justifying the
arrest: it was late at night in a rural area; the driver, who was under the influence of an
"intoxicant," failed to respond coherently to the officer's requests for identification and
registration; the officer saw a knife on the floor of the car; and the officer believed that the
suspect, who was not arrested, might have access to other unknown weapons in the car
when he returned to it. Id. at 1050.
139. Id. at 1052 n.16.
140. Id. at 1052. The Court declared, "we have not required that officers adopt alterna-
tive means to ensure their safety in order to avoid the intrusion involved in a Terry encoun-
ter." Id. By limiting scrutiny of available alternatives, the Court diminished an
individual's right to privacy by allowing officers to open containers in vehicles when they
see a weapon.
141. Id. at 1065 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 1061 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent wondered why the police officer
should be able to search a closed container only because it "'could have contained a
weapon."' Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1050-51). In addition, it questioned
what objects will justify an officer's search for "other" weapons. Id. It noted that both a
hammer and a baseball bat could be a deadly weapon. Id. Having these objects in a car
should not allow police officers to search containers looking for other "weapons." Id. It
also noted that the offense justifying the stop, driving under the influence of a drug, should
not signify danger to a police officer. Id. at 1062. It contended that it "requires imagina-
tion to conclude that [the suspect] is presently dangerous." Id. at 1062.
144. Id. at 1064-65.
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In contrast to the extremely heightened perception of danger in
Long, the Court's view of danger in Maryland v. Buie was more
rooted in the actual perception of danger, rather than mere possibility
of danger. In Buie, the Court applied the Terry frisk doctrine, and
allowed officers to conduct "protective sweeps" as they execute war-
rants. A protective sweep allows officers to inspect "those spaces
where a person may be found"145 if the officers have reasonable suspi-
cion to believe that danger is present. Thus, as with Terry stops, police
officers must have reasonable suspicion of danger.146
The Buie Court created the doctrine of protective sweeps based
on the progeny of Terry. The Court relied on the safety concerns dis-
cussed in Terry, Ybarra, and Long. 47 The Buie Court found these
cases supported the officers' authority to search the area imbued with
the greatest expectation of privacy-the home. The Court noted that
in contrast to an investigation on the street, an arrest in the home is
more dangerous to police officers because someone may "unexpect-
edly launch an attack." 4 The only restrictions on this doctrine arise
from the need to have reasonable suspicion that someone will harm
the officers, and that the search will last no longer than necessary to
effectuate the arrest.
In establishing the protective sweep doctrine, the Court merely
cited prior case law. It failed to balance the competing interests ex-
plicitly. Although Terry and its progeny balanced the danger to police
against an individual's interest in personal security and privacy, the
Buie Court focused on danger as the central factor in analyzing the
constitutionality of frisks.
Because reasonableness should be a flexible standard, one that
balances competing interests, the Court has diminished the right to
personal security by focusing solely on the mere possibility of danger.
145. Buie, 494 U.S. at 335.
146. The task of ascertaining whether the facts create the requisite danger produced
contrasting opinions in Buie. Although the majority remanded the case to the lower court
for an application of its articulated standard for protective sweeps, id. at 336-37, Justices
Stevens and Kennedy separately hinted how the lower court should decide the issue. Jus-
tice Stevens thought that a police officer's decision to go down basement stairs after arrest-
ing the person named in the warrant was inconsistent with the hypothesis that the danger
of an attack by a hidden confederate existed. Id. at 337 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice
Kennedy, however, thought that the officer's decision was sound. Justice Kennedy stated,
"the officers would have been remiss if they had not taken these precautions." Id. at 339
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). The contrasting views highlight the difficulty in assessing danger
when it becomes the talisman for reasonableness.
147. Id. at 333-35.
148. Id. at 333.
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By deferring too strongly to police safety, and by ignoring the alterna-
tives available to police officers, the Court has sanctioned police prac-
tices that interfere with an individual's personal security and privacy.
IV. Limiting Danger: Inherent Danger During Emergencies
and Arrests
The presence of danger has also been a significant factor in deter-
mining the actions police officers may take during emergencies and
arrests. Although the Supreme Court has never created an "emer-
gency" doctrine under the Fourth Amendment, it has stated that of-
ficers may perform community caretaking functions and may act
without a warrant if they have both probable cause and exigent cir-
cumstances.' 49 In noting that exigencies requiring prompt action
often occur, the Court has justified police actions taken for the public
good, even if these actions did not meet the standards for criminal
investigations. In the criminal context, the Court has focused on pro-
tecting police when they arrest suspects. The justification for both ac-
tions is perceived danger, either to the community or to the officer.
An examination of these doctrines reveals how misperceptions of dan-
ger can significantly erode the protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment.
A. Emergencies: Community Caretaking Functions
Under the community caretaking doctrine, police act to protect
society during emergencies. 150 The justification for the police action is
similar to the justification for conducting Terry frisks, except the po-
lice action is intended to protect the community rather than police
149. Although many of the exigent circumstances cases deal with the fear of losing
evidence, see, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753-54 (1984) (warrantless entry of
home held impermissible; even though evidence of intoxication may have dissipated by the
time the officer could have gotten a warrant, the evidence related to a minor offense),
danger analysis has at times allowed officers to enter a person's home without a warrant.
The presence of drugs and weapons may also constitute exigencies which can justify
entering a home without a warrant. Although a federal statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3109 (West
1985), limits a federal official's ability to enter without knocking, Justice White in Illinois v.
Condon urged the Supreme Court to evaluate the need to knock when officers believe that
the person to be arrested has both drugs and guns. 113 S.Ct. 1359, 1360 (1993)(White, J.,
dissenting from denial of order). Although he noted that some courts recognize exigent
circumstances simply because drugs are inside, the decision did not address how to handle
the entering when officers know that the suspect has just weapons. Id.
Recently the Supreme Court granted review to decide whether police officers must
announce their presence and purpose before forcibly entering a residence. See Wilson v.
Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 571 (1994) (officers executed a search warrant for drugs and a gun).
150. See infra text accompanying notes 153-161.
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officers, and, thus, the reasonable suspicion standard is inapplica-
ble.1 5' Under the community caretaking doctrine, the Court considers
only whether the officers reasonably believed that an emergency ex-
isted. 2 Thus, the constitutionality of the police action depends upon
the court's assessment of whether an "emergency," or a public need
for action, exists.
Exigency based on the need for safety can arise when police of-
ficers enter a home without a warrant, either to apprehend a killer or
to provide aid to those injured inside the home. The Supreme Court
recognized this type of exigency in Mincey v. Arizona.153 In Mincey,
the Court held that police officers could not conduct a detailed search
of a home without a warrant even though the suspect had allegedly
committed a murder. 4 Even though murder is a serious offense, the
Court examined all of the circumstances to determine whether the
requisite exigency existed. The Court found an exigency did not arise
solely from the nature of the offense because once the officers re-
moved the suspect from the house, the exigency disappeared.5 It did
note, however, that an emergency does exist when police officers "rea-
sonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid" or
that a killer or other victims are inside.'5 6
The Court has similarly allowed firefighters to enter burning
buildings not only to extinguish a fire but to investigate the origins of
the fire.' 57 In these cases, the need to protect police officers and the
public outweighs the suspect's interest in privacy. '
After a suspect is arrested, the Court allows police officers to in-
ventory the suspect's vehicle in order to protect community safety.
The Court in Cady v. Dombrowski'5 8 stated that when police officers
remove guns from vehicles left by arrested drivers they perform a
"community caretaking function[ ].,,159 These actions, according to
the Court, were divorced from criminal investigation. 60 In interpret-
151. See infra text accompanying notes 153-161.
152. See infra text accompanying notes 153-161.
153. 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978).
154. Id. at 393-94.
155. id.
156. Id. at 392. See generally Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1984) (officers
went to home after receiving a call that a suicidal mother shot her husband; search after
mother was removed from the home was impermissible).
157. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293 (1984) (plurality); Michigan v. Tyler,
436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978).
158. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
159. Id. at 441.
160. Id.
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ing the reasonableness of this preventive action, the Court refused to
consider the availability of other alternatives.161 Although the officer
in Dombrowski had reason to believe the car contained a gun, the
Court's interpretation of the inventory doctrine did not require such a
belief. The search was reasonable because the Court considered it to
be administrative rather than investigative.
The central question under the community caretaking doctrine is
whether the balance of interests justifies an officer's intrusive actions.
Reasonableness is determined by weighing the right to privacy and
personal security against the perceived danger. The degree of impor-
tance one places on danger, as with the other doctrines, can skew the
balance.
B. Searches Incident to Lawful Arrests: Inherent Danger
Inherent danger is a part of the justification for searches incident
to arrests. The automatic right to search an arrested person is built on
three rationales: preventing suspects from destroying evidence, de-
creasing the likelihood of escape, and protecting police officers. 62
Although these reasons justify the search, the Court in Chimel v. Cali-
fornia 63 stated that danger is present during all arrests."6
Because the Court considered arrests to be inherently dangerous,
the Court allowed officers to search an arrested person and the "area
within his immediate control" 65 for weapons. By searching the sus-
pect and the immediate area, the police officer could discover and
seize any weapon that would endanger the officer or help the suspect
escape.' 66 The Court limited the search area to the area immediately
surrounding the suspect, to safeguard the suspect's right to privacy.' 67
The Court also required the search to be contemporaneous to the
arrest because the need to conduct a search is based on the need to
protect the police officer. Because the officers in Chimel had searched
the entire house without a warrant, the search was unconstitutional. 68
161. Id. at 447. It stated: "The fact that the protection of the public might, in the ab-
stract, have been accomplished by 'less intrusive' means does not, by itself, render the
search unreasonable." Id.
162. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1968).
163. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
164. Id. at 762-63.
165. Id. at 763.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 768.
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The authority to conduct a search incident to a lawful arrest dif-
fers from the authority to conduct a Terry frisk. To frisk a suspect, a
police officer must have reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed
and dangerous; to conduct a search incident to a lawful arrest, the
police officer must only execute a lawful arrest before the search. The
officer's authority to search a suspect is automatically generated upon
arrest, because the Court perceives arrest to be inherently dangerous.
As a result, officers do not need to articulate reasons for their
searches under these circumstances.
Although the Court considers danger in evaluating both preven-
tive and aggressive police actions, a misperception of danger associ-
ated with the latter is more troublesome. The Court is more willing to
tip the scales in favor of officer safety when the intrusion does not
implicate bodily integrity. In recent evaluations of aggressive actions,
the lower courts have readily recognized the presence of danger.169
The lower courts have not properly weighed other Fourth Amend-
ment interests, namely the suspect's and society's interests in personal
integrity and privacy. By ignoring the alternatives available to police
officers, the courts have deferred to the judgment of governmental
officials. Such deference is erroneous because mistrust of governmen-
tal officials is implicit in the history of the Fourth Amendment. 1
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V. Litigating Unreasonable Force Claims
Excessive force claims arise whenever police officers use force
during investigations or arrests that is "unreasonable" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In determining whether the of-
ficers used reasonable force, some courts have used the presence of
danger as a litmus test.17 1 Although most claims occur when police
officers arrest suspects,172 claims may also arise when officers conduct
Terry stops, because officers often utilize intrusive means to check for
potential danger.' 73 An examination of these decisions reveals how
courts, in trying to protect police officers and society, have under-
mined each citizen's right to personal security.
169. See infra text accompanying notes 216-260.
170. See generally, Maclin, supra note , at 201
171. See infra text accompanying notes 216-260, 281-283.
172. See infra text accompanying notes 184-339.
173. See infra text accompanying notes 415-423.
648 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:623
A. Danger to Police Officers and the Community During Arrests
In Tennessee v. Garner74 and Graham v. Connor,175 the Supreme
Court made clear that the Fourth Amendment not only determines
when police officers may arrest suspects, but also how police officers
may arrest suspects. The Graham Court offered three factors to de-
termine whether the police conducted an arrest reasonably: the nature
of the offense committed, the immediate danger to police officers and
others, and the suspect's resistance.176 The Court, however, did not
state that these were exclusive factors, nor did it explain the weight of
each factor. The Court's indefiniteness is unsurprising, because no
specific guidelines can precisely describe the parameters of
reasonableness.
Even under a flexible standard, misperceptions are still possible.
Numerous lower courts have misread Garner and Graham as requir-
ing broad deference to police officers' statements that they feared for
their lives.' 7 7 When courts defer so broadly, the reasonableness in-
quiry loses meaning. Assessing the danger confronting police officers
and the community requires consideration of numerous questions.
What circumstances are relevant to the issue of reasonableness? Who
decides what is reasonable? What offenses increase the likelihood of
danger to police officers and others? What movements by suspects
create the inference of serious danger? What level of scrutiny should
courts use in considering the availability of less intrusive alternatives?
An examination of these issues reveals the need to give police officers,
juries, and courts greater guidance in determining the reasonableness
of force. Without better guidelines, courts may continue to mis-
perceive danger as the central issue in evaluating police practices.
1. Facts Relevant to the Reasonableness Inquiry
Although danger is a factor in determining the constitutionality
of the use of deadly force, courts disagree on the relevant time frame
for evaluating an officer's actions. Some courts freeze the time frame
to include only circumstances present at the moment the officer seized
the suspect; 78 others include circumstances prior to the seizure.179
174. See supra text accompanying notes 32-59.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 60-67.
176. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
177. See infra text accompanying notes 216-260.
178. See infra text and accompanying notes 184-195.
179. See infra text and accompanying notes 196-209.
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How courts resolve this issue significantly affects their assessment of
danger.
Resolution of this issue has in part depended upon how courts
interpret the Graham decision. In Graham, the Supreme Court stated
that the reasonableness inquiry must be rooted in the reasonable per-
ceptions of an officer:
The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged
from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather
than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.... The calculus of rea-
sonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police of-
ficers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-
about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation.180
The Court thus emphasized that built into the question of reasonable-
ness is a consideration that police officers, unlike courts and juries,
often need to make quick decisions. Yet, lower courts have inter-
preted this passage differently: some use it to construe narrowly the
relevant facts,' 8' some interpret it as requiring broad deference to the
judgment of police officers, 182 and others find the language as only
underscoring the nature of police work.183 An examination of these
contrasting views reveals the need for guidelines to assess relevancy.
One of the first cases to define the relevant circumstances nar-
rowly was Greenidge v. Ruffin."8 In Greenidge, an undercover officer
observed a woman enter a man's car. 85 The officer thought the wo-
man was a prostitute soliciting an illegal act. 86 Rather than request-
ing other officers for back up, the officer approached the vehicle
180. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.
181. See infra text accompanying notes 184-195.
182. See infra text accompanying notes 216-260.
183. See, e.g., Dickerson v. McClellan, 844 F. Supp. 391, 396 (M.D. Tenn. 1994). In
Dickerson, the district court rejected the officer's argument for great deference:
[I]n some cases these tough decisions must be second guessed, for not every post
hoc explanation, no matter how plausible or understandable, can justify every
officer's behavior. The best a court can do is attempt to understand the situation
as seen by the police and then apply standards of objective reasonableness within
these confines ... the court would point out that of course not all hindsight is
barred in these cases; rather, only antiseptic hindsight. Judging the weight to be
assigned to evidence is entirely appropriate, not to mention inevitable.
Id. The court sent to the jury the issue of whether police officers had used unreasonable
force. Id. The jury, the court held, was to determine the facts and apply the standard of
reasonableness to the ascertained facts. Id.
184. 927 F.2d 789, 791-92 (4th Cir. 1991).
185. Id. at 790.
186. Id.
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without bringing her flashlight. 87 With her police badge hanging
from her neck, she went to the car, opened the door, identified herself
as an officer, and ordered the two suspects "to place their hands in
view."' 88 When the occupants did not respond, the officer drew her
weapon and repeated her order. She saw the man "reach for a long
cylindrical object from behind the seat."' 89 She then fired at the man,
causing him serious injury. 190 The object turned out to be a wooden
nightstick.' 9 '
The Fourth Circuit in Greenidge held that two facts were not rele-
vant to the reasonableness inquiry: the officer's failure to have a back-
up and her failure to use her flashlight.' 92 In determining whether the
officer violated the Fourth Amendment, the court too narrowly de-
fined the circumstances relevant to the issue of reasonableness. The
court declared that the conditions confronting the officer the moment
she pulled the trigger are the relevant circumstances. 93 In short, the
court refused to consider the alternatives available to the officer to
investigate the crime. To the Fourth Circuit, reasonableness did not
include the officer's conduct prior to the shooting that could have cre-
ated the need to use deadly force. Since this decision, the Fourth Cir-
cuit has adhered to its narrow reading of relevance. 94 Other courts
have also misread Graham to require a narrow time frame.195
187. Id.
188. Id. at 790.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 791.
193. Id. at 792.
194. See Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 780 (4th Cir. 1993). In Drewitt, a plain clothes
police officer attempted to stop a person who was driving recklessly. Id. at 776. The of-
ficer, who did not display his badge, drew his weapon and shouted to the driver to stop. Id.
When the vehicle stopped, the officer walked in front of it. Id. While he was in front of it,
the vehicle sped forward, hitting the officer. Id. After landing on the hood of the vehicle,
he shot the driver twice. Id. The Fourth Circuit held that the officer's failure to identify
himself was not relevant to the determination of whether the shooting was reasonable. Id.
at 780. After determining that there were no material facts in dispute, the court affirmed
summary judgment for the officer. Id. See generally James v. City of Chester, 852 F. Supp.
1288, 1295 (D.S.C. 1994) (reasonableness requires examining the circumstances at the mo-
ment the officer used force; it was irrelevant that the officer did not "station a guard at the
entrance to the ... apartment.... [nor] the officer's failure to employ proper back up and
use a flash light").
195. See, e.g., Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328, 1332-3 (7th Cir. 1992). In narrowly
defining the relevant time frame, the Seventh Circuit in Carter refused to consider the
serious misjudgments of several police officers. Id. Police officers believed that a suspect
had hired someone to kill his wife. Id. at 1329. Because the suspect frequently bragged
that he was always armed, police officers decided to create a ruse to arrest him on a high-
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In contrast, other courts have broadly defined the relevant facts
for the reasonableness inquiry.19 6 By expanding the time frame, the
fact-finder has greater opportunity to scrutinize police practices. In
doing so, the fact-finder may perceive less danger.
A case that reveals the importance of utilizing a broader time
frame is the Seventh Circuit's decision in Estate of Starks v. Enyart.'97
In Estate of Starks, the court found all of the police actions prior to a
fatal shooting to be relevant. 198 The police knew the suspect had sto-
len a taxi without the use of violence.199 The suspect later parked the
taxi next to another car.2°" An officer then parked his police car be-
hind the suspect.201 Three officers then surrounded the vehicle: one at
the driver's window, one at the rear, and another in front of the vehi-
cle, standing behind a utility pole.2° When the suspect refused to
comply with an officer's request to get out of the taxi, he put the car in
reverse to give him more space to make a sharp turn around the utility
pole.20 3 When the suspect drove forward, an officer behind the pole
placed himself in danger by "moving out from behind the pole without
way in order to protect themselves and limit the likelihood of injury to bystanders. Id. at
1329-30. When the suspect agreed to help a stranger who was allegedly stranded on the
road, police officers pretended to be the stranded motorist. hL at 1330. When the suspect
failed to get out of his car and examine the engine of the allegedly malfunctioning car,
police officers became restless and approached him as he sat in his car. Id. One officer
shined a flashlight into his eyes and shouted "state police." Id. The suspect began firing
and hit an officer. Id. After numerous rounds of fire, the suspect and an officer died. Id.
For the Seventh Circuit, the relevant time frame began once the suspect started shoot-
ing the officer. Id. at 1332. It refused to consider whether the officers had done anything
to precipitate the gunfire. Id. at 1333. The officers' decision to arrest him on the road and
to directly confront him as he was seated were not relevant to the issue of reasonableness.
Id. The Seventh Circuit rooted its decision in the language of Garner and its view that the
reasonableness inquiry began only when the suspect was actually seized. Id. at 1332-33.
The reasonableness question arose at the moment the officer shot the suspect. Id. It
stated: "The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures not unreasonable, unjus-
tified or outrageous conduct in general." Id. at 1332. It explained that even if the plan to
arrest him was poor, the reasonable inquiry began when the officers seized the suspect. Id.
at 1332-33. It also quoted from the district court, which feared second-guessing the judg-
ment of police officers: "'[a] contrary holding would create a cottage industry wherein the
federal courts would be called upon to second guess police officers as to every discretion-
ary decision regarding time and place of arrest."' Id. at 1331.
196. See, e.g., Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230, 233-35 (7th Cir. 1993); Gilmere v.
City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1502 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115
(1986); Dickerson v. McClellan, 844 F. Supp. 391, 396-97 (M.D. Tenn. 1994).
197. 5 F.3d 230 (7th Cir. 1993).
198. Id. at 234.
199. Id. at 233.
200. Id. at 232.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Starks, 5 F.3d at 232.
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leaving [the suspect] time to stop the car. '2°4 All three officers then
shot and killed the suspect.20 5
The Seventh Circuit criticized the actions of the officers and de-
termined that under the suspect's version of the facts, the officers cre-
ated the dangerous situation that justified the use of deadly force.2°
It noted that the suspect's original offense was nonviolent, and con-
cluded that deadly force was impermissible. °7 It explained, "[i]f a
fleeing felon is converted to a 'threatening' fleeing felon solely based
on the actions of a police officer, the police should not increase the
degree of intrusiveness. '' 208 To find the shooting reasonable under
these circumstances would be to find reasonable a shooting of a driver
who accidentally is about to kill a police officer.20 9
Thus, the Seventh Circuit did not narrowly construe relevancy.
In contrast to the Greenidge decision, which refused to consider that
the officer failed to request back-up or to use her flashlight, the Sev-
enth Circuit found the actions prior to the shooting to be relevant. In
using a broader time frame, the court considered whether the officers
created the need to use force as a factor in assessing danger. Other
courts have similarly allowed broader time frames in assessing the de-
gree of danger officers faced when they acted aggressively.210
204. Id. at 234.
205. Id. at 232.
206. Id. at 233-34.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 234.
209. Id. at 235. The court also added that the two officers who were not behind the
utility pole had to go to trial to resolve the Fourth Amendment claim against them. Id. It
refused to grant them immunity simply because a fellow officer's life was in danger based
on his own misconduct. Id.
210. See, e.g., Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1502 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc),
cert denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986); Dickerson v. McClellan, 844 F. Supp. 391, 396-97 (M.D.
Tenn. 1994).
The Eleventh Circuit in Gilmere considered all of the circumstances that preceded an
officer shooting the suspect. Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1502. TWo officers believed that a sus-
pect, who had been heavily drinking, had threatened another driver with a gun taken from
the trunk of his car. Id. at 1496. The officers went to the suspect's home and the suspect
resisted going to the officers' cruiser. Id. at 1496-97. An officer then began beating him.
Id. at 1497. The suspect reached for one of the officer's guns. Id. at 1497 n.1. It fell to the
ground, and another officer shot the suspect as he "lunged toward" him. Id. In assessing
the danger posed to the officer who shot the suspect, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
shooting was unreasonable. Id. at 1501. It stated: "[A]ny fear on the officer's part was the
fear of retaliation against his own unjustified physical abuse.... [A] moment of legitimate
fear should not preclude liability for a harm which largely resulted from his own improper
use of his official power." Id. Danger was also lessened by the facts that the suspect was
small, drunk, and lacked a weapon when the officers arrived. Id. at 1502. Danger arose
because of the officers' provocation, not the suspect's conduct. Id. The court upheld the
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The court's definition of the relevant time frame thus affects their
determination of reasonableness and their perception of danger.
Courts that narrowly define the relevant circumstances do not scruti-
nize police practices that occur before a shooting. Courts that broadly
define the relevant circumstances do not freeze the time frame at the
moment of the shooting, and consider the facts that occur before a
shooting. Although the Supreme Court in both Garner and Graham
recognized that police officers often have to make quick decisions, the
Court did not equate deference with a lack of scrutiny. By broadly
defining the relevant circumstances, a court acknowledges the impor-
tance of limiting governmental power that unduly infringes on an indi-
vidual's right to personal security.
2. The Jury's Role: Civil Fourth Amendment Claims
When suspects sue police officers for injuries incurred during
their arrests, they allege both that the officers seized them and that
the officers used unreasonable force. The difficulty in establishing this
type of claim centers on the second issue-reasonableness-because
when police officers intentionally use physical force they have effectu-
ated a Fourth Amendment seizure. 211 Although the issue of reasona-
bleness seems like a classic issue for a jury, courts disagree on the
jury's role in evaluating unreasonable force claims. The central issue
in the controversy is whether the objective reasonableness standard
established in Garner and Graham favors having the courts decide
reasonableness on summary judgment.
district court's judgment that the officers acted unreasonably in killing the suspect. Id. at
1505.
By expanding the time frame to conduct prior to a challenged shooting, a federal
district judge in Dickerson v. McClellan, 844 F. Supp. 391, 396-97 (M.D. Tenn. 1994), also
sent the issue of reasonableness to the jury. The officers in Dickerson entered a house
without a warrant, without knocking, or announcing their presence. Id. at 392. All that
they knew was that a shooting had occurred in the neighborhood and were directed to the
suspect's home. Id. When the homeowner grabbed his gun to respond to unknown people
entering his house, the officers shot him. Id. In dispute was whether the homeowner
pointed a gun at the officers. Id. Instead of freezing the time frame at the moment of the
shooting, the court held that the officers' misconduct prior to the shooting was relevant to
the issue of reasonableness. Id. at 396. The court explained, "[a]cting on a hunch that
someone could be in danger and then taking actions that could place themselves and any-
one inside in greater danger are not objectively reasonable behaviors by an officer." Id.
The court thus determined that the issue of reasonableness required consideration of the
officer's conduct prior to the shooting. Id.
211. See, ag., Kathryn R. Urbonya, "Accidental" Shootings as Fourth Amendment
Seizures, 20 HASUNGS CONST. L.Q. 337, 354-367 (1993).
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A typical unreasonable force case requires the trier of fact to de-
termine what actually happened at the scene of the arrest. Police of-
ficers and suspects rarely agree on the facts. To resolve material,
disputed facts, juries often have to make credibility determinations.
In doing so, the jury fulfills its role as fact-finder. 12 The jury may also
decide how to apply the reasonableness standard to the given facts.2 3
Numerous courts have recognized the jury's role, and have properly
denied summary judgment in unreasonable force cases.21 4
In contrast, some courts interpret the Supreme Court's decisions
in Garner and Graham as requiring courts to strongly defer to the
judgment of police officers in evaluating reasonableness. 1 5 This def-
erence arises because courts perceive scrutiny as impermissible sec-
ond-guessing of split-second judgments made by police officers.
Under this interpretation reasonableness becomes a means of ac-
knowledging the difficult nature of police work. With this perspective,
many courts have misinterpreted the jury's role.
In Krueger v. Fuhr,21 6 the Eighth Circuit usurped the jury's power
to determine reasonableness by resolving a case on summary judg-
ment. In Krueger, an officer alleged he heard the suspect withdraw a
212. See, e.g., Ronald J. Bacigal, Putting the People Back into the Fourth Amendment, 62
GEo. WASH. L. Rnv. 359, 363 (1994).
213. See id. at 364 ("'[r]easonableness vel non was a classic question of fact for the
jury') (quoting Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1179 (1991)).
214. See, e.g., Butler v. City of Norman, 992 F2d 1053, 1055 (10th Cir. 1993) (jury must
decide whether police officers beat handcuffed suspect with a flashlight and kneed him in
the groin); Kane v. Hargis, 987 F.2d 1005, 1008 (4th Cir. 1993) (jury must determine
whether the officer who slammed the suspect's head into the pavement was in danger, in
light of the fact that the suspect weighed 100 pounds and the officer weighed 200 pounds);
Spann v. Rainey, 987 F.2d 1110, 1114-15 (5th Cir. 1993) (retrial granted because a jury
could find unreasonable the striking of a suspect in a diabetic coma for failing to identify
himself); Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1045 (6th Cir. 1992) (jury might find
unreasonable the officers' repeated use of their guns); Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339,
1348 (11th Cir. 1991) (jury must decide whether the force was objectively reasonable);
Walmsley v. City of Philadelphia, 872 F.2d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
955 (1989) (jury must decide whether officer hit the suspect); Dickerson v. McClellan, 844
F. Supp. 391,397 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) (jury must determine whether the suspect presented a
threat to the officers).
215. See infra text accompanying notes 216-260.
216. 991 F.2d 435, 439 (8th Cir. 1993). An officer in Krueger heard that a suspect had
just assaulted someone, that he had a knife, and that he was using drugs. Id. at 436-37.
When the officer saw a person lying on the ground and noted that he matched the descrip-
tion of the suspect, the officer withdrew his gun and ordered the suspect to freeze. Id. at
437. The suspect got up and began running. Id. When the officer was about three to four
yards from the suspect, the officer believed that he could hear the suspect pull an object
from his waist. Id. Because he was afraid that he would run into the suspect, the officer
slowed down and shot the suspect in the back and head. Id.
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knife as he chased after the suspect.2 17 By allegedly reaching towards
his waist, the suspect heightened the officer's perception of danger.21 8
The court found the shooting was reasonable as a matter of law, even
though the knife was found forty-three feet from the suspect's
body.219
The Eighth Circuit stated it was not concerned with the knife's
location because an officer need not see a weapon in order to believe
the suspect is armed and dangerous.220 The Court stated that a furtive
gesture was sufficient; whether the suspect actually had a gun was
deemed immaterial.22' Furthermore, the officer's decision to shoot
the suspect in the back and head was also immaterial because, the
Court boldly stated, "it is not remarkable that an escaping felony sus-
pect would be shot in the back."'  It specifically refused to question
whether, considering the circumstances, the officer should have al-
lowed the suspect to flee rather than kill him.223 Even if the Eighth
Circuit's factual interpretations were uncontested, it is difficult to
agree with the court's conclusion that the court, rather than the jury,
should decide the issue of reasonableness under these circumstances.
The Sixth Circuit also diminished the importance of the jury in
Smith v. Freland.24 The court's review of police officers' conduct was
extremely deferential, practically nonexistent. In Smith, a driver re-
fused to pull over for police after running a stop sign.25 A high-speed
pursuit then occurred, during which the driver allegedly swerved his
car towards the officer's police car twice.226 When the suspect turned
down a dead-end street, the police set up a roadblock at the entrance
217. Id. at 437.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 439.
220. Id.
221. Id.; see also Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 1988). In Sherrod, the
Seventh Circuit held that whether a suspect is in fact armed is not relevant. Id. at 807. It
stated, "[W]e categorically reject the district court's assertion that fairness requires that the
jury be presented with facts unknown and unavailable to Officer Berry at the time of the
shooting (that Sherrod was unarmed)." Id. at 806. It also expressed great deference to
decisions by police officers: "The Sioux Indians have a prayer that asks for this wisdom:
'Grant that I may not judge another until I have walked a mile in his moccasins."' Id. The
dissent, however, thought whether the suspect actually had something in his pocket would
aid the jury in determining the type of gesture the suspect in fact had made and resolving
conflicts in testimony. Id. at 810 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
222. Krueger, 991 F.2d at 439-40.
223. Id. at 440.
224. 954 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1954 (1992).
225. Id. at 344.
226. Id.
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of the road. 27 On one side of the suspect was a fence and behind him
was a public swimming pool.2 An officer parked in front of the sus-
pect's car and got out of his car.2 9 The suspect then rammed the of-
ficer's car as he started driving away.2 30 The officer, who was not in
any danger, shot the driver as he headed for the roadblock.23'
The Sixth Circuit justified the shooting by hypothesizing a need
for the shooting: the suspect was headed toward the roadblock, and
endangered the lives of the officers at the roadblock. Furthermore,
the suspect seemed desperate to get away, and "could have stopped
his car and entered one of the neighboring houses, hoping to take hos-
tages."2 32 This latter "justification" is just plain fanciful. In determin-
ing the conduct was reasonable as a matter of law, the Sixth Circuit
refused to consider whether alternatives were available to the shoot-
ing officer:
[U]nder Graham, we must avoid substituting our personal no-
tions of proper police procedure for the instantaneous decision
of the officer at the scene. We must never allow the theoretical,
sanitized world of our imagination to replace the dangerous and
complex world that the police face every day. What constitutes
"reasonable" action may seem quite different to someone facing
a possible assailant than to someone analyzing the question at
leisure. 33
Although danger is a factor in determining reasonableness, the mere
presence of danger does not justify absolute deference to police of-
ficers, or erosion of the jury's role in determining reasonableness.
The Ninth Circuit, in Scott v. Henrich,23 4 also erroneously decided
the reasonableness of a fatal shooting. The officers in Scott shot a
suspect when he allegedly came to his door with a gun.235
The Ninth Circuit held the officer's conduct was reasonable as a
matter of law, even though the gun allegedly possessed by the suspect
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 344.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 347.
233. Id. at 347.
234. 994 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1992).
235. Id. at 1340-41. In Henrich, two police officers were investigating a shooting from a
two-story apartment. A young child stated that he had seen a man with a gun on the
second story. One of the officers then saw a man in a window on that floor. The officers
went to an apartment, knocked and announced that they were police. According to the
police officers, the suspect opened the door and had a gun in his hand. The officer nearest
the door then fired a shot, missing the suspect. The second officer, believing that the sus-
pect had fired, fired four shots at the suspect, killing him.
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did not contain the suspect's fingerprints. Like the Sixth Circuit in
Smith, the Ninth Circuit hypothesized reasons for the lack of finger-
prints. The court suggested that perhaps the fingerprints were missing
because the suspect did not sweat enough, because the surface of the
gun was "too rough to take prints," '2 3 6 or because the smooth part of
the gun was too small for a fingerprint. 37 The court found the shoot-
ing reasonable as a matter of law, despite its recognition that police
officers should not benefit from killing the only opposing witness-the
suspect.238 As with other courts deciding factual issues, the court
stated it was not its duty to consider whether the police officers had
alternatives available to them.239
The Seventh Circuit usurped the jury's role in Ford v. Childers24
by affirming a district court's grant of a directed verdict for an officer
at the close of the plaintiff's case. In Childers, a police officer ob-
served a masked man robbing a bank.2 41 However, the officer could
not see what the suspect held in his outstretched hand.242 The officer
allegedly ordered the suspect to stop as he exited the bank.243 A foot
chase ensued, and the officer allegedly again ordered the suspect to
stop.24  When he did not, the officer shot him in the back.245
The Seventh Circuit held the officer's conduct was reasonable,
relying on the nature of the offense committed by the suspect-armed
robbery-to justify the shooting.246 The court stated that this offense
alone indicated the suspect posed "a danger of serious harm to others
if not immediately apprehended."2 47 The court rejected expert testi-
mony that the officer should have considered other alternatives, and
rejected the suspect's assertion that he did not hear the officer's com-
mands to stop.24s The court relied on language from Garner that
stated that an officer may use deadly force on a suspect if he has
"probable cause" to believe that the suspect has committed a violent
236. Id. at 1343.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1341.
239. Id. at 1342 ("Officers... need not avail themselves of the least intrusive means of
responding to an exigent situation; they need only act within that range of conduct we
identify as reasonable.").
240. 855 F.2d 1271, 1277 (7th cir. 1988).
241. Id. at 1272.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1275-76.
247. Id. at 1275.
248. Id. at 1276.
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offense.249 The court saw no room for disagreement regarding the se-
rious nature of armed robbery. It justified the use of deadly force
based upon the category of the offense. The court failed to consider
that it was the jury's role to assess the reasonableness of this shooting.
In determining the conduct was reasonable as a matter of law, the
court cited the split-second nature of the officer's decision.25 0
Although the court explicitly warned that shooting should not be "an
automatic response to the law enforcement officer when attempting to
capture a fleeing felon,"'251 the court failed to limit such shootings or
have a jury determine the reasonableness of the such shootings.
Finally, in Drewitt v. Pratt,252 the Fourth Circuit determined that a
shooting was reasonable as a matter of law. Again, in interpreting
reasonableness, the court granted significant deference to the judg-
ment of police officers. 53 In Drewitt, a plain clothes police officer
observed a reckless driver.254 Without displaying his badge, the of-
ficer ordered the driver to stop.255 When the driver stopped, the of-
ficer walked in front of the car.5 6 The suspect then hit the officer
with his car. The officer rolled onto the hood, fired two shots and
killed the driver.57 The court held that it could decide whether the
officer's actions were reasonable.5 8 The court deemed it unimportant
that the officer walked in front of a vehicle with no lights at night, that
had crashed into another vehicle.259 The court stated that any dispute
in facts was "more imagined than real," and thus the court robbed the
jury of its role in determining whether the officer's conduct was
reasonable.260
When courts grant extreme deference to the judgments of police
officers, they deprive juries of their role in determining whether the
officers used reasonable force within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Because a reasonableness standard does not create
bright-line rules, juries are better able to examine the totality of cir-
cumstances in excessive force cases. Juries may help clarify important
249. Id. at 1274.
250. Id. at 1276.
251. Id. at 1276 (emphasis omitted).
252. 999 F.2d 774, 780 (4th Cir. 1993).
253. Id. at 779-80.
254. Id. at 776.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 776.
258. Id. at 779-80.
259. Id. at 780.
260. Id.
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elements of the reasonableness standard as applied to the use of force.
Two important issues for juries are the significance of the nature of
the suspect's offense, and whether the suspect's actions justified an
officer's belief that the suspect was a danger to the police or the
community.
3. Offenses Signifying Danger to Officers and the Community
In Garner, the Supreme Court allowed police officers to use
deadly force if they had probable cause to believe a suspect "commit-
ted a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious
physical harm." '2 6 1 This language suggests that an officer may shoot a
serial killer in the back, even if the officer himself is not in danger.
This passage from Garner, however, should be read with the Court's
immediacy requirement. To justify a shooting, a police officer must
perceive immediate danger, whether to himself or the community.
Thus it is important to determine whether certain offenses automati-
cally create an inference that the community is in danger unless the
police immediately seize the suspect.
The Garner Court did not specify the types of offenses that would
allow a police officer to shoot a suspect. It merely stated that a night-
time burglary suspect fleeing from a home does not signify the requi-
site danger to allow the police to shoot him.262 In analyzing the
Garner decision, a few courts are heavily influenced by whether the
suspect committed a violent offense. In Krueger v. Fuhr,2 63 the Eighth
Circuit evaluated an armed assault, and in Ford v. Childers,64 the Sev-
enth Circuit considered an armed robbery. In both cases, the officers
had reason to believe the suspects were armed and in both cases, the
officers shot the suspects in the back after they failed to heed their
commands to stop. Krueger and Ford appear to create a per se rule,
allowing police to shoot fleeing suspects if the police had probable
cause to believe the suspect committed a violent offense. This per se
rule arises because the courts decided that the shootings were reason-
able as a matter of law.
However, most courts do not center their analysis on the alleged
offense. Rather, they focus on the suspect's actions during his con-
frontation with the police. When the confrontation involves a high-
261. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.
262. Id. at 25.
263. 991 F.2d 435 (8th Cir. 1993). For a discussion of this case, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 216-223.
264. 855 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1988). For a discussion of this case, see supra text accom-
panying notes 240-251.
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speed pursuit, some courts consider the pursuit itself to be an indica-
tion that the suspect is a danger to the community.265 Some courts
believe high-speed pursuits increase danger, and possibly justify a
shooting.266  The Fourth Amendment does not apply when the
Supreme Court decisions suggest police pursue suspects in cars be-
cause the police do not "seize" drivers during these pursuits.267 Thus,
although some courts often do not scrutinize officers' decisions to en-
gage in high-speed pursuits under the Fourth Amendment, they nev-
ertheless consider the pursuits to assess whether the driver presented
a danger. As a result of this peculiar view of the Fourth Amendment,
some courts refuse to evaluate whether it is reasonable to initiate
high-speed pursuits of suspects who speed,268 fail to pay highway
tolls, 269 drive through stop signs, 271 skid when leaving a gas station,
271
or drive while intoxicated.272 Other courts, however, have properly
questioned whether the officers conducting a pursuit have created the
danger to the community.273
4. Furtive Gestures: Inferring Danger to Police Officers
Some courts have determined that a "furtive gesture" by a sus-
pect justifies an officer to reasonably believe the suspect was reaching
265. See, e.g., Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1954 (1992).
266. See supra text accompanying notes 224-233.
267. See, e.g., Ronald J. Bacigal, The Right of the People to Be Secure, 82 Ky. L.J. 145,
162 (1994) ("The history of the chase cases suggests that the Court intends to achieve its
agenda for enhancing police power by whatever means are necessary."); Kathryn R.
Urbonya, The Constitutionality of High-Speed Pursuits under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 205, 270-85 (1991).
268. See Horta v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 2, 7 (1st Cir. 1993).
269. See Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1330 (8th Cir. 1993).
270. See Freland, 954 F.2d at 344.
271. See Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1991).
272. See Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1270-71 (5th Cir. 1992). In Fraire,
the Fifth Circuit stated that a suspect was dangerous within the meaning of Garner because
he drank as he drove, drove erratically, and sped "through a residential subdivision, twice
crashing the car." Id. at 1276 n.30.
273. See, e.g., Brower v. County of Inyo, 884 F.2d 1316, 1317-18 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1989)
("[I]t might be argued that the substantial threat requirement was not met because any
danger proceeded from the fact that the police gave chase. This is not to say that the police
should never chase suspected car thieves, only that the danger created by the chase would
not give them license to use deadly force when it is necessary to prevent escape."); Dono-
van v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir. 1994) (jury could find that ramming of
motorcyclist during pursuit was unreasonable; officer chased suspect because he failed to
answer questions about a nearby explosion). See generally Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22
F.3d 1283, 1294 (3d Cir. 1994) (municipality may be liable under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment for failing to train police officers not to conduct pursuits for minor traffic offense
when circumstances indicate danger to the public).
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for a weapon. 74 To justify a shooting under the "furtive gesture" doc-
trine, officers do not need to see a gun, knife, or even a glint of steel
because of the role of the action/reaction theory.275
Furtive gestures can create an inference of danger because ex-
perts believe that the suspect has time to kill the officer by the time a
police officer sees a glint of steel.276 In Matthews v. City of Atlanta,277
a federal court judge stated that police officers may draw their guns in
response to a suspect's furtive gesture even if they would not be justi-
fied to draw their guns under the Garner standard. The court ruled
that to find otherwise would be to constitutionally require police of-
ficers to put themselves in danger.278
274. See, e.g., Krueger, 991 F.2d at 437. In Krueger, an armed assault suspect had alleg-
edly made a furtive gesture by reaching for his waist. The officer, having other facts to
support his belief that the suspect had a knife, shot him in the back. Id. The Eighth Circuit
found the requisite danger because of the prior armed assault and the furtive gesture. Id. at
439.
275. See, e.g., Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 806-07 (7th Cir. 1988). In Sherrod, the
suspect had allegedly robbed a store and had previously committed other "assaultive
crimes." Id. at 803. After police officers stopped the suspect, one officer behind the vehi-
cle had his weapon pointed at the car as did the officer who approached the car. Id. When
the passenger failed to comply with an officer's repeated commands to raise his hand, the
passenger then allegedly made a furtive gesture by quickly moving "'his hand into his coat
... [as if] he was going to reach for a weapon."' Id. (quoting the police officer's testimony)
(brackets in original). The officer then killed the passenger. Id. The court stated that it
was for the jury to determine whether this gesture justified the killing. Id. at 806-07. In
determining that it was not relevant whether the suspect actually had a weapon, the court
interpreted the Fourth Amendment to require consideration of the split-second nature of
officers' decisions. Id. at 805. The Seventh Circuit stated: "[C]ourts and juries must deter-
mine the propriety of the officer's actions based upon a thorough review of the knowledge,
facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time he exercised his split-second judg-
ment as to whether the use of deadly force was warranted." Id. at 805.
276. See, e.g., Kevin Parsons, Decision to Use Force: The Confrontational Continuum,
in 8 CIVIL RIoHTs LITIGATION AND ATrORNEY FEEs ANNUAL HANDBOOK 115, 119-20
(1992). Dr. Parsons, a frequent expert in trials involving the use of unreasonable force,
described the problem of officers dealing with knives:
Our own testing in conjunction with government contracts for the design of use of
force training programs has shown that an individual can draw a knife from a
concealed position and cover 21 feet to stab an individual in the face before the
average police officer can unholster his weapon and fire one shot. Obviously,
knowledge of such threats or lack of knowledge of such issues can have a signifi-
cant impact upon the reasonableness of an officer's actions.
Id. at 120. Under this theory, if the officer waited to see a glint of steel the suspect would
have been able to assault him before he could have reached his gun. Dr. Parsons also
noted that certain circumstances need to exist before a furtive gesture could create the
inference of danger. In his example, the suspect must be within 21 feet of the officer.
Thus, not all furtive gestures create the inference of danger.
277. 699 F. Supp. 1552, 1556-57 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
278. Id. at 1557.
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To justify a shooting, police officers must reasonably believe a
suspect has the ability and opportunity to harm them and that either
their lives or the lives of others are in jeopardy. 9 The element of
jeopardy captures Garner's requirement that the suspect present an
immediate danger to officers or the community.28° A suspect's furtive
gestures place the lives of police officers in jeopardy. The act of
reaching for an unknown object can justify a shooting if an officer
believes a suspect has the ability and opportunity to harm her and the
intention to kill the officer.
Under some circumstances a suspect's movement may create a
reasonable belief that the suspect is reaching for a gun,281 knife,282 or
other unknown, but possibly threatening, object on the floor or back-
279. See, Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243, 246-47 (7th Cir. 1993). In Ellis, the Seventh
Circuit explicitly linked the furtive gesture doctrine with the Fourth Amendment's require-
ment of jeopardy. The suspect in Ellis had allegedly burglarized a pharmacy. Id. at 245.
He had broken into it by using a sledgehammer to create a hole in a back wall. Id. After
returning the hammer to his car, the suspect surreptitiously took some drugs and money.
Id. When the investigating officer saw the hole, he drew his gun and later noticed a person
outside. Id. He ordered the suspect to stop. Id. When the suspect stopped walking and
turned around, he suddenly tossed the bag containing drugs at the police officer. Id. This
lightweight bag did not daze the officer or dislodge his gun. Id. When the suspect began
running, the officer shot him in the back. Id. In analyzing all these facts, the court stated
that a jury must decide the issue whether the shooting was reasonable. Id. at 247.
The court's discussion of furtive gestures focused on three facts: the suspect's cloth-
ing, the quick toss of the bag at the officer, and the lack of harm to the officer. Id. at 246-
47. The suspect was wearing pants and a sleeveless shirt. Id. at 245. This attire, the Sev-
enth Circuit stated, could not support a belief that the suspect had a hammer on him. Id. at
246-47. It explained, "[w]hile it was possible that [the suspect] carried a concealed weapon,
as much as it is possible that every felon might be carrying a weapon, [the officer] had no
particular reason to believe that [the suspect] was armed." Id. at 247. The court, in consid-
ering the clothing and the original offense, did not believe that it was reasonable at that
moment to believe the suspect was armed. Id.
The act of tossing a bag at an officer could be a furtive gesture because the suspect
could have disarmed or dazed the officer, allowing him to reach for a weapon. In this case,
however, the court noted that after tossing the bag, the suspect did not reach for a weapon.
id. At that point, the court declared, a shooting would be unjustified because the officer
could not reasonably believe that the suspect had a weapon. Id. The court wisely noted
jeopardy is a necessary condition for a gesture to be "furtive": "When an officer faces a
situation in which he could justifiably shoot, he does not retain the right to shoot at any
time thereafter with impunity." Id. Because the tossing of the bag did not result in the
suspect reaching for a weapon, the officer could not later shoot the suspect in the back
since he was no longer in jeopardy. Id.
280. See generally Samples v. City of Atlanta, 916 F.2d 1548, 1551 (11th Cir. 1990) (ex-
pert testified that the three elements of ability, opportunity, and jeopardy represent the
industry's standard for measuring force).
281. See Sherrod, 856 F.2d at 805.
282. See Krueger, 991 F.2d at 439.
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seat of a car.28 3 Furtive gestures also occur when a suspect throws an
object at an officer. 84 Under these circumstances, the suspect's origi-
nal offense may or may not influence the police officer's belief that
the suspect reached for a weapon. If the suspect's original offense
involved a weapon, the officer's belief that the suspect was reaching
for a weapon is more reasonable." 5 In many cases, however, courts
do not consider the original offense and declare that the furtive ges-
ture itself signified the requisite danger justifying a shooting.286 Some
courts also fail to consider whether the officers could have prevented
the furtive gesture by using other means to apprehend the suspect.2 1
The suspect's gesture must signify danger to the police officer
before the police officer can justify shooting the suspect. In today's
society, where so many citizens are armed, courts and juries may be
more willing to assume that a furtive gesture justifies an officer's be-
lief that the suspect was reaching for a weapon. The right to personal
security is more symbolic than real, however, if courts and juries auto-
matically make this inference without considering the surrounding cir-
cumstances. In most situations, police officers would be wise to
ascertain other facts to support the belief of immediate danger.
5. Lunging at Police Officers: The Need for Escalating Forc
Other movements by suspects, though not actually furtive ges-
tures, may also increase an officer's perception of danger. In contrast
to the furtive gestures cases, in which police officers shoot suspects
because they fear for their lives, police officers often escalate the
amount of nonlethal force they use when suspects "lunge" at them.
283. See Greenidge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 790 (4th Cir. 1991) (reached toward back-
seat); Young v. City of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349, 1351 (5th Cir. 1985) ("reached down to the
seat or floorboard of his car").
284. See Wynalda, 999 F.2d at 247.
285. See Krueger, 991 F.2d at 436-37 (suspect had allegedly assaulted someone and had
a knife); Sherrod, 856 F.2d at 803 (armed robbery suspect).
286. See, e.g., Wynalda, 999 F.2d at 247 (tossing a heavy object at officer could consti-
tute a furtive gesture); City of Killeen, 775 F.2d at 1352 (alleged sudden movement created
danger).
287. See, e.g., Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 500-01 (5th Cir. 1991); City of Killeen,
775 F.2d at 1353 (even if the officer negligently created the situation that made the shoot-
ing more likely, the suspect's furtive gesture justified the shooting).
In Reese, nine police officers had surrounded a robber in his vehicle. Reese, 926 F.2d
at 496. Even though an officer's siren made it difficult for the car's occupants to hear the
commands to put their hands above their heads, the court nevertheless upheld a shooting
that followed an alleged furtive gesture. Id. at 500-01. It stated that the officer's life would
have been in danger if he would have had to shut off the sirens because the act would have
"divert[ed] his attention." Id. at 496.
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The issue in this area is the degree of danger a lunge represents and
what type of force is a reasonable response to the suspect's aggressive
action.
In evaluating the significance of a lunge, courts need to consider
all of the circumstances to discern the danger presented by a suspect.
In Tom v. Voida,288 a suspect allegedly stole a bicycle and smashed a
police officer's head into the pavement twice as the officer attempted
to arrest him. The suspect subsequently lunged at the officer during a
struggle. 9 The Seventh Circuit held that the suspect's act of lunging
at the officer significantly heightened the officer's perception of dan-
ger.29° The court, however, did not allow the jury to decide whether
the suspect's motion was one of surrender or aggression.29' Similarly,
in Pride v. Does,292 the Eighth Circuit allowed a police officer to
choke a suspect to prevent him from lunging at her. The court held
that the suspect was threatening as a matter of law because of his prior
disorderly conduct, his use of profanity, the "intense expression on his
face, 2 93 and his intoxicated state.294
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit in Gilmere v. City of Atlanta re-
quired the trial court to determine the significance of a suspect's act of
lunging at a police officer. 95 The suspect allegedly threatened an-
other person with a weapon.2 9 6 In a bench trial, the trial court deter-
288. 963 F.2d 952,955 (7th cir. 1992). The court noted that the officer did not try to use
a chemical repellant because in doing so, the suspect would have had access to her weapon.
Id. at 962. It also noted that the officer did not have her nightstick with her. Id. In consid-
ering these facts, the court found her conduct reasonable as a matter of law. Id. The court
stated that the medical evidence concerning the officer's injuries and numerous witnesses
supported the officer's version of what happen. Id. at 961. It reasoned that no other alter-
natives were available to the officer other than killing the suspect. Id. at 962. The court
thus appeared to consider the offenses that the suspect committed prior to the shooting to
support the officer's judgment that her life was in danger when the suspect allegedly
lunged at her.
289. Id. at 955.
290. Id. at 962.
291. Id.
292. 997 F.2d 712,717 (10th Cir. 1993). The officer believed that her action was neces-
sary "in order to restrain him from lunging toward her." Id. at 714.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 717. The handcuffed suspect, however, thought the force was merely retalia-
tory for his comments about her sexual orientation. Id. at 714. Even though the suspect
denied getting out of his chair, the court held that the choking under the circumstances was
reasonable as a matter of law. Id. at 717. It relied on her affidavit, which stated that
intoxicated people are often violent. Id. Once again in assessing danger, the court broadly
deferred to the officer's judgment as to the need for force. Once again a court erroneously
deprived a jury of the opportunity to determine reasonableness.
295. 774 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986).
296. Id. at 1496.
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mined the officers had provoked the suspect into lunging.297 Because
the officers provoked the suspect to lunge at them, they could not cite
the suspect's act of lunging as justification for their use of deadly
force.298 In addition, the court noted that police officers' lives were
not at risk because the suspect was physically smaller than the officers
and inebriated at the time of the shooting.299 The court held that the
shooting was unreasonable.300
When suspects lunge at officers, the reasonableness inquiry man-
dates consideration of all of the circumstances. A lunge alone may
not justify a shooting based on danger. The type of police response
that is permissible depends not only upon the assessment of danger,
but also upon the assessment of reasonableness.
Courts vary in their determination of reasonableness. Some
courts consider whether the officers had alternative means available
to seize the suspects. Other courts refuse to consider alternatives or
fail to discuss the role of alternatives. This can result in conflicting
determinations of reasonableness.
6. Minimizing Danger: Available Alternative Analysis
Courts most frequently dispute whether the reasonableness in-
quiry should include an analysis of alternatives available to the seizing
officers.3 0 ' The Supreme Court indirectly discussed the role of alter-
natives in Tennessee v. Garner,30 2 as it examined whether the police
may lawfully use deadly force to apprehend fleeing suspects. The
Garner Court decided that under some circumstances, the use of
deadly force is unconstitutional even if the officers may never appre-
hend the suspect. 30 3 In balancing the interests of suspects, society, and
law enforcement officers, the Court recognized its decision limited the
means police officers could use to apprehend suspects.30 4 The Court
noted, however, that by prohibiting some shootings, it was not neces-
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1502.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 1505.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 184-210. In qome respects this issue is similar
to the issue of defining the relevant time frame for evaluating the officers' actions. The
issues overlap to the extent that they both may discuss whether the officers' actions, which
created the need for force, are relevant to resolving the issue of reasonableness. The issues
are different in that if the officers did not create the need for force, the issue of alternatives
focuses only the means that the officer used to seize a suspect.
302. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
303. Id. at 11.
304. Id. at 9-10.
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sarily barring police officers from apprehending fleeing suspects. °5
The Court explained that "failure to apprehend at the scene does not
necessarily mean that the suspect will never be caught. '306 In short,
the Court recognized that police may utilize other means to seize sus-
pects rather than rely on the use of deadly force. However, the issue
of whether the reasonableness requirement mandates courts and ju-
ries to consider whether the seizing officers should have used less in-
trusive means also arises when officers use non-lethal means to seize
suspects. 30 7 Most courts that have discussed the availability of alter-
natives have not clarified how closely they should scrutinize the alter-
natives available to police officers.308 Some courts equate the
consideration of alternatives available to officers' with improper sec-
ond-guessing of police officers judgment. The Sixth Circuit has
strongly objected to second-guessing the judgment of police of-
ficers.3 °9 It stated, "We must never allow the theoretical, sanitized
world of our imagination to replace the dangerous and complex world
that policemen face every day. '3 10 When the Sixth Circuit does ex-
amine alternatives available to police officers, it affords great defer-
ence to the judgment of officers when the officers used nonlethal force
to seize suspects.31'
The Fifth Circuit has also refused to explore the significance of
alternatives. In Young v. City of Killeen,312 an expert testified that the
officer could have utilized six different actions to aid in the apprehen-
sion of the suspect. The Fifth Circuit refused to consider expert testi-
mony regarding proper police procedure to analyze the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness issue, but did consider the expert testi-
mony in upholding the trial court's state law negligence claim for the
plaintiff.313 The Fifth Circuit did not explain why the expert testimony
was relevant to the negligence claim, but not to the Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness claim. In another case, the Fifth Circuit also
305. Id. at 9 n.8.
306. Id.
307. See, e.g., Soares v. Connecticut, 8 F.3d 917, 921 (2d Cir. 1993) (Graham did not
create a per se rule allowing officers to use handcuffs during all arrests); Walton v. City of
Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1342 (6th Cir. 1993) (handcuffing may be unreasonable if officer
knows that it would injure a suspect).
308. See infra text accompanying notes 314-323.
309. See, e.g., Freland, 954 F.2d at 346-47.
310. 954 F.2d at 347.
311. See, e.g., Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1044 (6th Cir. 1992) (by using
a Taser, the officer sought "to obviate the need for lethal force").
312. 775 F.2d 1349, 1351 (5th Cir. 1985).
313. Id. at 1352-54.
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seemed to ignore a department investigative report that was critical of
an officer.31 4 The report criticized the officer for chasing a driver
down a cul-de-sac and standing in front of the driver's vehicle, inviting
"the truck to aim for him."3 '' The court never mentioned that the
officer could have used other means to seize the suspect.
The Seventh Circuit sent a mixed message regarding the role of
alternatives in Tom v. Voida.316 Although the Court noted that the
officer's only means for self-defense at the time of an impending at-
tack was her gun,31 7 the court never discussed the significance of the
officer's failure to have her nightstick with her. Although a baton can
be both a lethal and nonlethal weapon, the court did not suggest this
omission was relevant to the issue of reasonableness.
A similar issue arises when courts consider violations of depart-
ment procedure. Many courts believe these violations are relevant to
the reasonableness analysis.318  All courts agree that such violations
do not automatically signify a Fourth Amendment violation; however,
some courts consider violations to be irrelevant to the reasonableness
analysis.319 Both the Ninth Circuit 320 and a federal district court32 '
have failed to consider these violations as an aspect of reasonableness.
The Ninth Circuit refused to consider violations of police guidelines
dealing with barricaded suspects, because the guidelines were
designed to protect police officers and the community, not suspects.3 22
Similarly a federal district court held that even if the officers' plan to
seize a mentally ill suspect was reckless, the plan had "no bearing on
whether [the officer] reasonably believed plaintiff posed a threat of
serious injury."3"
Other courts, however, recognize that the reasonableness inquiry
requires consideration of all circumstances facing an officer. These
courts often assert they are not using hindsight to evaluate reasona-
bleness, but are simply analyzing the officer's conduct in light of all
the circumstances, including any available alternatives. Some Ninth
314. See Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1276 (5th Cir. 1992).
315. Id. at 1272.
316. 963 F.2d 952, 958 (7th Cir. 1992).
317. Id. at 962.
318. See, eg., Soares, 8 F.3d at 922 (department handcuffing policy was relevant to, but
not dispositive of, the issue whether handcuffing constituted excessive force; reasonable-
ness requires considering all of the circumstances of an arrest).
319. See infra text accompanying notes 320-323.
320. See Scott v. Henrich, 994 F.2d 1338, 1342 (9th Cir. 1992).
321. O'Toole v. Kalmar, No. 85-C 7380, 1990 WL 19542, at *9 (N.D. I11. Feb. 23, 1990).
322. Scott, 994 F.2d at 1342.
323. O'Toole, 1990 WL 19542, at *9.
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Circuit decisions have highlighted the importance of this inquiry. In
Brower v. County of Inyo, the court interpreted the Garner standard
as requiring two inquiries: (1) Did the suspect's conduct create a "sig-
nificant threat" to the safety of officers; and (2) "[d]id a reasonable
non-deadly alternative exist for apprehending the suspect?"' 24 The
court stated the second inquiry was focused on whether the use of
force was necessary and compelled the consideration of alterna-
tives 2.3 1 In a later decision, the court similarly stated that reasonable-
ness requires consideration of "alternative courses of actions" open to
officers.326
In discussing the role of alternatives, the Fourth Circuit has found
expert testimony helpful in determining reasonableness. In Kopf v.
Skyrm,327 the Fourth Circuit recognized that experts may explain what
constitutes the "prevailing standard of conduct" for various weapons.
For example, experts can explain how to effectively use canines, slap-
jacks, handcuffs, mace, and guns.328 In describing these police tools,
experts help the jury understand that while the jury should not use
hindsight to judge the officers, neither should it use it to "absolve"
them.329 Other courts have similarly relied upon the use of expert
324. 884 F.2d 1316, 1317-18 (9th Cir. 1989).
325. Id. at 1318.
326. Hopkins v. Andaya, 958 F.2d 881, 887 (9th Cir. 1992) (italics omitted). In Hop-
kins, an officer hit a suspect with his baton. Id. at 883. When the suspect got the baton
from the officer, he hit the officer. Id. The officer responded by shooting the suspect. Id.
The officer then radioed for help, reloaded his gun, and hid behind a car. Id. When the
suspect advanced again, the officer shot him. Id. In evaluating these facts, the Ninth Cir-
cuit stated the reasonableness of the second shooting required consideration of alternatives
available to the officer:
[The officer] was armed with several weapons and could hide behind a car. [He]
had already called for help; he needed only to delay [the suspect] for a short
period of time. He could have evaded [the suspect], or he could have attempted
to subdue him with his fists, his feet, his baton or the butt of his gun.
Id. at 887. The court held these alternatives supported its denial of summary judgment for
the officer. Id. at 888. A jury would have to consider the significance of these alternatives.
Id.
327. 993 F.2d 374, 379 (4th Cir. 1993).
328. Id.
329. Id. The court held that the trial court erred in excluding the expert testimony on
the proper use of canines and slapjacks. Id. It explained that the role of experts depends
upon the facts of each case:
Where force is reduced to its most primitive form-the bare hands-expert testi-
mony might not be helpful. Add handcuffs, a gun, a slapjack, mace, or some
other tool, and the jury may start to ask itself: what is mace? what is an officer's
training on using a gun? how much damage can a slapjack do? Answering these
questions may often be assisted by expert testimony.
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testimony330 and have distinguished between automatic deference to
the judgment of officers, and reasonable scrutiny of the officers' ac-
tions on the scene of the arrest.
331
The Seventh Circuit, in Villanova v. Abrams,332 stated that the
availability of alternatives is a part of the reasonableness inquiry
under the Fourth Amendment. In evaluating a Fourth Amendment
claim based on an unlawful seizure during a civil commitment, the
court held that unreasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is the
same issue as unreasonableness for negligence claims. 33 3 It stated that
Justice Learned Hand's formula for negligence applied to the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness standard: negligence occurs when the
"burden of precautions" was less than the "loss if there is an accident
that the precaution could have prevented" and "the probability of an
accident. '334 This formula, the court observed, considers the burden
of alternatives, a burden evaluated in light of the likelihood of harm to
individuals and the community.335 The court explicitly measured dan-
gerousness based on the probability that the suspect would cause
harm if free.336 It also noted that under the reasonableness standard,
less intrusion is permitted if the person has committed "a trivial
crime, 337 a factor specifically articulated in Graham v. Connor.338
The Seventh Circuit concluded that this algebraic formula is neverthe-
less a standard requiring judgment on the part of officials. 39
Id. The court added that even if the jury would not have difficulty understanding the po-
lice weapon, sometimes it must permit experts to testify as to the standard for using the
weapon. Id.
330. See, e.g., Samples v. City of Atlanta, 916 F.2d 1548, 1551-52 (11th Cir. 1990) (trial
court properly allowed experts to testify as to the "prevailing standards in the field of law
enforcement" on the use of force and as to whether the physical evidence supported the
officer's testimony as to the suspect's acts and reactions to his use of force).
331. See, ag., Childers, 855 F.2d at 1276 ("[A]n officer oftentimes has only a split sec-
ond to make the critical judgment of whether to use his weapon. But this fact alone will
never immunize an otherwise unreasonable use of deadly force."); Dickerson, 844 F. Supp.
at 396 (Sometimes "tough decisions must be second guessed, for not every post hoc expla-
nation, no matter how plausible or understandable, can justify every officer's behavior.").
332. 972 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1992).
333. Id. at 796. It stated, "The test of negligence at common law and of unlawful search
or seizure challenged under the Fourth Amendment is the same: unreasonableness in the
circumstances." Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 796-97.
336. Id.
337. Id at 797.
338. 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
339. Abrams, 972 F.2d at 796.
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Thus the circuit courts of appeals disagree as to how to evaluate
reasonableness; however, all courts focus on danger, whether to the
officer or the community. The issue of available alternatives invites
consideration of whether officers had less intrusive means to appre-
hend suspects. This issue for some courts, however, is intertwined
with the difficult nature of police work, which often compels quick
decisions. Alternative analysis can therefore limit the scope of defer-
ence juries and courts afford police officers' assessments of danger.
The difficulty of alternative analysis is perhaps most obvious
when courts consider how police officers should apprehend suspects
who suffer serious psychological problems. In apprehending these
suspects, the police must not only consider the danger facing them-
selves and the community, but also the danger the suspect presents to
himself.
B. Psychologically Disturbed Suspects and the Danger to Officers and
the Community
The presence of danger is also a crucial issue when police officers
seize an individual to protect the individual from harming him or her-
self. In this context, police have neither reasonable suspicion nor
probable cause to believe that the individual committed a crime. The
seizure is justifiable, because it protects the individual from him or
herself. In evaluating whether these seizures are reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, courts focus on the degree of danger present.
Courts have considered three different issues: whether the officer had
probable cause to believe the individual was a danger to himself,"0
whether unsolicited assistance by police officers, known as a "welfare"
stop, was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment,341 and whether the officers used reasonable force when they
confronted a disturbed person.2
A number of courts have noted that when police officers take a
psychologically disturbed individual to a mental institution, they have
seized the individual under the Fourth Amendment.' 3 The issue in
these cases is whether the circumstances known to the officers created
probable cause to believe the suspect was a danger to himself.3'
340. See infra text accompanying notes 344-348.
341. See infra text accompanying notes 442-462.
342. See infra text accompanying notes 350-360.
343. See, e.g., Glass v. Mayas, 984 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1993); Harris v. Pirch, 677 F.2d
681, 686 (8th Cir. 1982); Maag v. Wessler, 960 F.2d 773, 775-76 (9th Cir. 1991).
344. See, eg., Glass, 984 F.2d at 58 (officers acted pursuant to a state law that allowed
an emergency psychiatric examination when they have "'reason to believe that the individ-
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When officers seize individuals under these circumstances, they must
analyze the psychological state of individuals. The Fourth Circuit, in
Gooden v. Howard County,345 described the problem of such seizures.
It explained that although officers cannot arbitrarily subject citizens to
psychological evaluations, the standard for such seizures has not been
defined by courts:
Certainly the concept of "dangerousness" which calls on lay po-
lice to make a psychological judgment is far more elusive than
the question of whether there is probable cause to believe some-
one has in fact committed a crime. The lack of clarity in the law
governing seizures for psychological evaluations is striking when
compared to the standards detailed in other Fourth Amendment
contexts, where probable cause to suspect criminal misconduct
has been painstakingly defined." 6
After recognizing the problem of asking police officers to assess "psy-
chological" dangerousness, the court further confused this difficult
task by placing broad ranging deference in the police officers' alleged
facts. It found that case law had not defined "dangerousness with the
requisite particularity" to give officers guidance as to what conduct
compels psychological evaluations.317 It strongly deferred to the judg-
ment of police officers, criticizing the dissent for making every en-
counter with police officers into "credibility contest[s]." 8  In
assessing danger, the majority thought that repeated screams from an
apartment occupied by a single woman indicated that she was psycho-
logically disturbed.34 9
In addition to assessing psychological harm, officers also have to
consider danger in the manner of their seizures. Sometimes officers
have to use force to control a psychologically disturbed individual.
When courts consider these claims, the officers generally assert that
their forceful actions were in self-defense. What began as an act to
render aid became an act of self-protection. Although this type of
self-defense claim is similar to the assertions officers make in defend-
ing their use of force during arrest, the context is different because the
officer is dealing with psychologically impaired citizens. A few cases
have examined the use of force against such individuals.
ual has mental disorder and that there is clear and imminent danger of the individual's
doing bodily harm to the individual or another') (quoting state law); Maag, 960 F.2d at
776 (officer had probable cause to believe that suspect was a danger to himself).
345. 954 F.2d 960, 968 (4th Cir. 1992).
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 966 n.1.
349. Id.
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When a suspect is psychologically impaired, many courts do not
discuss whether the suspect's condition affects the determination of
reasonableness. In Krueger v. City of Algoma,5 0 the Seventh Circuit
did not discuss the officer's failure to know that a driver was suicidal,
even though other officials knew. The court never questioned
whether the officer should have used other means to seize the dis-
turbed driver.
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Russo v. City of Cincinnati3 51 never
mentioned whether officers should closely examine the means they
use to seize a person believed to be both suicidal and homicidal. 2 In
analyzing the use of force, the court appeared to show greater defer-
ence to the officer's decision to use nonlethal force to seize the indi-
vidual than to the officer's decision to use lethal force. 53 Perhaps, by
sanctioning the initial use of a Taser on the subject, the court recog-
nized the volatile task of seizing a disturbed individual.
The question of whether an officer shot a mentally unbalanced
person in self-defense was an issue for the jury in Samples v. City of
Atlanta 4.35  An officer observed a person in a telephone both "scream-
ing like a demented person. 3 5 When the officer approached the per-
son, he threw a bottle at the officer.35 6 The individual then
approached the officer with a knife, and the officer shot him until he
fell to the ground. 7 In determining that the lower court erred in
granting summary judgment for the officer, the court did not mention
350. 1 F.3d 537, 540-41 (7th Cir. 1993). The court granted summary judgment for the
officer, who stopped the driver. Id. at 540. Prior to committing a traffic violation, the
driver had been taken into custody and threatened to kill himself if he got a ticket. Id. at
538. After the parents notified the police that his son had taken a gun, an officer stopped
the son. Id. at 538-39. According to the officer, the individual got out of the car, pointed a
gun at the officer, who hid behind his car. Id. at 539. The driver then attempted suicide by
shooting himself. Id. In analyzing the stop, the court justified the stop because the driver
had allegedly committed a traffic offense. Id. at 540. It appeared immaterial to the court
that the police department knew that the driver was suicidal. The court never mentioned
whether the officer should have seized the suspect in another manner.
351. 953 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir. 1992).
352. Id. at 1044.
353. Id. at 1044-45. It twice stated that the use of nonlethal force demonstrated "an
effort to obviate the need for lethal force." Id.
354. 846 F.2d 1328, 1332-33 (11th Cir. 1988).
355. Id. at 1331.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 1331-32. Another court has held that once an officer lawfully shoots an
individual, the officer may continue to shoot until the suspect ceases presenting any harm.
O'Neal v. DeKalb County, 667 F. Supp. 853, 858 (N.D. Ga. 1987) ("[T]he Constitution
does not require police officers to use a minimum of violence when attempting to stop a
suspect from using deadly force against police officers or others.").
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whether the officer properly approached the demented individual.358
The court only stated that a jury must resolve the disputed facts.359
Thus, when officers encounter psychologically disturbed individu-
als, the courts do not seem to analyze the means officers use to appre-
hend these individuals, nor do they question whether the act of
dealing with these individuals affects the reasonableness analysis. As
with "welfare stops, '360 the courts recognize that officers need to seize
unbalanced individuals who may be a danger to themselves, police of-
ficers and society. Many courts appear to decide that danger was
present, but do not set limits on when action based on danger unnec-
essarily infringes on the right to privacy and personal security.
VI. Litigating Preventive Actions: Asserting Authority and
Self-Protective Searches
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to
allow police officers to conduct protective searches, under some cir-
cumstances, when they investigate crimes. As with the use of force in
apprehending suspects, the means officers use to conduct their investi-
gations must be reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Courts typically find protective searches to be reasonable when
officers act to safeguard their well-being. Courts have allowed officers
to conduct Terry frisks,3 61 to search suspects incident to the officers'
arrest,362 to search areas that pose a danger to the officers, 363 and to
enter a home without knocking and without a warrant in order to
safeguard their lives or the lives of others.3 Often these actions are
deemed reasonable because they decrease the potential harm to the
officers or others. Preventive searches raise two important issues: (1)
what types of circumstances signify danger justifying the use of pre-
ventive measures; and (2) if danger is present, what types of preven-
tive measures are constitutionally reasonable? An examination of the
decisions discussing preventive actions reveals the complexity of these
issues and the trend towards affording police officers great deference
in their assessment of danger.
358. Id. at 1333.
359. Id. at 1332-33.
360. See infra text and accompanying notes 442-462.
361. See infra text accompanying notes 367-405.
362. See infra text accompanying notes 463-474.
363. See infra text accompanying notes 404-405.
364. See infra text accompanying notes 442-444.
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A. Danger during Terry Stops: Protective Frisks and Protective
Sweeps
To lawfully frisk a suspect, police officers must believe that dan-
ger is present. In Terry v. Ohio,365 the Court stated that a frisk is
lawful if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe the suspect
"is" armed and dangerous or that the suspect "may be" armed and
dangerous.366 Since this decision in 1968, there is little doubt that
courts only require reasonable suspicion that the suspect "may be"
armed.367 Similarly courts today allow officers to use more intrusive
actions to protect themselves than previous courts would have al-
lowed.368 Today, many courts and officers perceive the high degree of
danger when officers seize suspects.
To justify frisking a suspect, an officer must articulate why he
thought the suspect was potentially armed.3 6 9 If an officer sees a gun
on a suspect before he lawfully stops him,3 7 0 the officer clearly has
reason to believe the suspect is armed. An officer also has reason to
believe a suspect is armed when the officer has a reasonable suspicion
that the suspect just committed an offense using a weapon, even if the
officer did not see the weapon. In most situations, however, the cir-
cumstances are less clear cut, and courts and officers simply draw in-
ferences from the circumstances at the time of the seizure. Thus, it is
important to determine what type of circumstances reasonably signify
danger justifying a frisk. Most courts consider all of the circumstances
in analyzing whether a suspect may have been armed and danger-
ous, 371 which is logical, because the reasonableness inquiry mandates
that the courts weigh all the circumstances. Nevertheless, courts give
particularly strong weight to certain factors.
An anonymous tip that an individual at a particular location was
armed persuaded two courts in two separate cases to find a frisk rea-
365. 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1967).
366. Id. at 30.
367. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 24 F.3d 299, 304 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (In the past, the
standard might have required a belief that the suspect was armed; today the standard is
that the suspect may have been armed).
368. Id. (Modem courts approve of preventive actions that "might have raised judicial
eyebrows at the time the Terry decision was issued.").
369. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
370. For an excellent discussion of lawful Terry stops, see Tracey Maclin, The Decline of
the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
1258, 1264-83 (1990).
371. See infra text accompanying notes 377-390.
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sonable.372 Although the only corroborating evidence in these cases
was that the police located the described person, both the Court of
Appeal for the District of Columbia and Second Circuit found the
stop and the frisk procedures to be reasonable under the circum-
stances.3  These courts held that a frisk was the only way the officers
could safely investigate the alleged crime of possessing a gun.374 The
Second Circuit did not want to require an officer to "wait until the
individual brandishes or uses the gun., 375 Both courts relied on statis-
tics to show the prevalence of gun possession and to document the
danger from the misuse.376
Courts also strongly weigh facts indicating that a suspect has a
history of using weapons to commit crime. Although no courts have
found this fact to be dispositive in upholding a Terry frisk, one court
seemed to suggest that this fact goes a long way towards establishing
372. United States v. Bold, 19 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Clipper, 973
F.2d 944, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Bold, 19 F.3d at 104.
376. Id.; Clipper, 973 F.2d at 951. The Second Circuit in Bold described in detail the
dangers of guns throughout the nation and in New York, the place where the frisk
occurred:
The district court painted a frightening picture when it noted that (1) 200 million
handguns and other lethal weapons are in circulation in the United States, (2)
more than 4.2 million firearms are added to that total each year, and (3) these
weapons caused some 37,000 gunshot deaths in the United States in 1990, and
approximately 259,000 nonfatal injuries.... Moreover, New York City has a pop-
ulation of approximately eight million, yet as the district court found, only
122,137 pistols are licensed in the city. Those circumstances might be supple-
mented by the facts that (1) the City of New York, where those officers served
and protected, has a well-documented history of illegal hand-gun possession ...
and (2) New York State has approximately eighteen million people according to
the 1990 census, yet has only issued gun permits to approximately eighteen thou-
sand people a year from 1982 to 1992 .... In short, the overwhelming majority of
the people in New York State and City are not licensed to carry handguns.
Bold, 19 F.3d at 104 (citations omitted). In citing these statistics, the court was attempting
to justify the officer's belief both that the stop and frisk were reasonable, despite the Sec-
ond Amendment, which allows citizens to bear arms. See generally STEPHEN P. HAL-
BROOK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMs: STATE AND FEDERAL BIus OF RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES, at x (1989) ("The complete history of the right to keep
and bear arms remains hidden in many respects."); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON
HAWKINs, THE CITIZEN'S GUIE TO GUN CONTROL 146 (1987) ("[T]here is a neat role
reversal in the mostly liberal advocates of gun control urging reliance on settled precedent
while many conservative anticontrol partisans plead for a radical judicial reinterpretation
of this element of the Bill of Rights."); William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and
the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236, 1254 (1994) (the Second Amendment right
to bear arms is limited; one may not have a right to own a howitzer or to carry a weapon
into courtrooms or schools); Thomas M. Moncure, Jr., The Second Amendment Ain't
About Hunting, 34 How. L.L 589, 597 (1991) (Second Amendment is about liberty).
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the requisite danger. In State v. Valentine,377 the New Jersey Supreme
Court upheld a frisk,378 stating that the fact that the suspect had previ-
ously used a weapon to commit a crime did not automatically create
an inference of danger.3 79 The court explained that other facts con-
tributed to the officer's reasonable suspicion, such as the suspect's
presence in a high-crime area late at night and his "weak alibi" when
asked what he was doing.380 However, these circumstances are fre-
quently present during most police stops. The court emphasized the
need for officer safety, noting that it "'should not set the test of suffi-
cient suspicion that the individual is 'armed and presently dangerous'
too high when protection of the investigating officer is at stake.'
381
Deference to the officer's split-second judgment was appropriate, the
court stated, because the decision could have "life-and-death conse-
quences. ' 3 2 The court thus considered the frisk reasonable because it
was a minimal intrusion and because there was a great need for officer
safety.383
Another fact often justifying a frisk is the type of crime the sus-
pect allegedly committed. For some courts, certain crimes automati-
cally create an assumption that a weapon is present. Numerous courts
today believe that if an officer has a reasonable suspicion to believe
the suspect possesses drugs, the officer also has a reasonable suspicion
to believe the suspect has a weapon.384 When courts draw this infer-
ence, they automatically uphold the officer's frisk. Some courts, how-
ever, limit the presumption by requiring officers to reasonably believe
the suspects were involved in "serious" drug offenses, such as heavy
377. See, e.g., State v. Valentine, 636 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1994).
378. Id. at 514.
379. Id. at 510-11.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 509 (quoting United States v. Riggs, 474 F.2d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 820 (1973)).
382. Valentine, 636 A.2d at 509.
383. Id. at 513-14.
384. See, e.g., United States v. Cannon, 15 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 1994) (frisk permissi-
ble when officer reasonably believed that suspect was a cocaine dealer); United States v.
Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1992) ("drug trafficking ... created a wholly credible
concern that at least some of the suspects might be armed"); United States v. Alexander,
907 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1990) ("this Court has repeatedly acknowledged the dangerous
nature of the drug trade and the genuine need of law enforcement agents to protect them-
selves from the deadly threat it may pose"); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 62 (2d Cir.
1977) (guns are "tools of the trade" for narcotics dealers); State v. Evans, 618 N.E.2d 162,
169 (Ohio 1993) ("right to frisk is virtually automatic when individuals are suspected of
committing a crime, like drug trafficking, for which they are likely to be armed").
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drug trafficking or selling cocaine.38 Other offenses such as rob-
bery386 may also create an automatic presumption that the suspect has
a weapon.
Actions, such as furtive gestures, by suspects or passengers in a
vehicle may also signify danger. As with unreasonable force claims,
furtive gestures often allow officers to frisk an individual on the
stree 87 or in a car. 388 In most cases, unexplained hand movement
constitutes a furtive action, and create a reasonable belief that the in-
dividual is reaching for a weapon, because many courts believe that
traffic stops are inherently dangerous.389 The Fifth Circuit interpreted
a suspect's act of stepping back after an officer ordered the suspect to
385. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 542 A.2d 912, 916 (N.J. 1988). But see State v. Guy, 492
N.W.2d 311, 316 (Wis. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3020 (1993) ("To require police to
distinguish between major and insignificant dealers or users before making a limited frisk
for weapons would be impractical and could unreasonably put officers in danger." Yet the
court refused to apply an automatic frisk rule, stating that "the constitutionality of each
such frisk will continue to depend upon its facts.").
386. See, e.g., United States v. Rundle, 461 F.2d 860, 864 (3d Cir. 1972). But see People
v. Hampton, 606 N.Y.S.2d 628, 629 (1994) (even if officer had reasonable suspicion to
believe that suspect was about to rob a taxidriver, frisk was unreasonable).
387. See, e.g., United States v. Michelletti, 991 F.2d 183, 184-85 (5th Cir. 1993) (suspect,
who had a "cocky attitude," exited bar with drink in one hand and his hand in his pocket;
officer thought the hand should not have stayed in the pocket so long); Poole v. State, 639
So.2d 96, 97-98 (Fla. 1994) (drug suspect, who reached for his waistband and put something
in his pocket, refused to take his hand out of his pocket, creating a "bulge").
388. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 994 F.2d 317, 320-21 (7th Cir. 1993) (frisk of
suspect and car were reasonable; the driver "leaned forward at a forty-five degree angle for
several seconds"); People v. Corpany, 859 P.2d 865, 871 (Colo. 1993) (officer properly
frisked fanny pack after passengers in the back seat appeared to be putting something
underneath the seat); State v. Smith, 637 A.2d 158, 168-9 (N.J. 1994) (person in back seat
of car leaned forward, possibly passing an object; the passenger appeared nervous, cried
after officer told her he was going to frisk her; her later statement, "It's not mine, they
made me put it in there," justified the frisk).
389. See, e.g., United States v. Tellez, 11 F.3d 530,533 (5th Cir. 1993) (stopping car with
three passengers, one of whom may have violated parole, was "potentially dangerous");
Cousart v. United States, 618 A.2d 96, 101 (App. D.C. 1992) ("While the progress of the
auto may have stopped at the time [the officer] arrived, there was nothing to suggest or
show to the responding officers the danger was over."). But see State v. Pierce, 642 A.2d
947, 963 (N.J. 1994). In Pierce, the New Jersey Supreme Court, after noting the danger
arising from traffic stops, determined that some police practices designed to protect of-
ficers can be too intrusive:
We are mindful that police officers are at risk whenever they make a vehicular
stop, and that a significant percentage of assaults on police officers occur in the
course of traffic stops.... Nevertheless, out of the substantial number of ordinary
citizens who might on occasion commit commonplace traffic offenses, the vast
majority are unarmed.
Id. at 960. It held that under its state constitution that officers could not automatically
search a vehicle when the driver is arrested for a traffic offense. Id. at 959.
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stop, as indicating that the suspect was giving "himself [some] space to
draw a weapon. "390
Some courts more readily perceive danger when an officer con-
ducts an investigation with many individuals present. No court would
justify a frisk of an individual just because the person was part of a
group; however, when one person in a group may be involved in
crime, some courts more easily draw the inference of danger and per-
mit the officer to act preventively.
An extreme example of how some courts readily conclude that a
person is armed is the federal district court case of United States v.
Jaramillo.39' In Jaramillo, officers believed that a man returning from
the restroom in a small bar might be armed because two other men
had tossed a gun on the floor when the police ordered everyone in the
bar to freeze.392 The court held the officer's frisk of the suspect was
reasonable because the person was standing near the men who previ-
ously had a gun.393 The presence of an actual gun aided the belief that
another person in a bar may have one as well.
Other courts394 have similarly relied upon a "group danger" the-
ory. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals395 interpreted the presence of
many individuals as justifying two contrasting police actions: an officer
was allowed to frisk a suspect in part because the presence of three
390. United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572,1575 (5th Cir. 1992). In Rideau, the dissent
properly criticized the majority for allowing a frisk of an alleged inebriated person just
because he stepped backward:
[I]f [the suspect] had stepped forward, [the officer] most certainly would have
viewed it as threatening. Had the defendant stepped to the right or left, it would
have been interpreted as nervousness or an attempt to flee. If [the suspect] had
remained stiffly frozen in place, it would have been viewed, presumably, as a
show of guilt or of abnormal behavior caused by drugs or alcohol.
Perhaps if [the suspect] had graduated from charm school and had been
taught how to look "cool and collected" in the face of approaching uniformed
officers, he could have managed to avoid the patdown.
Id. at 1581. (Smith, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that by finding danger justifying the
frisk, the majority nullified the Fourth Amendment right to personal security. Id. at 1584-
85 (Smith, J., dissenting). It explained that although officers do often face danger, the
Fourth Amendment does protect them from unnecessary danger: to frisk, they must have
reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous. Id. at 1585 (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
391. 822 F. Supp. 118, 120 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
392. Id. at 119-20.
393. Id. at 120.
394. See, e.g., United States v. Tellez, 11 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir.1993) (Officers "knew
that they were entering a potentially dangerous situation by stopping a truck with three
passengers, one of whom they believed to be a parole violator."); see also United States v.
Michelletti, 991 F.2d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1993).
395. Michelletti, 991 F.2d at 185.
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men near the suspect increased the officer's sense of danger; the frisk
of the suspect was permissible to protect the three men and the officer
from possible danger by the suspect. 396 Officers also sometimes assert
that the sense of danger was heightened because of the suspect's atti-
tude. 97 One court approved of the frisking of young disorderly kids
who wore baggy clothing because the Court felt the youth's bold be-
havior could indicate they carried a weapon. 98
Another important issue is whether a person's presence at a loca-
tion that officers are searching to find illegal drugs inherently signifies
that the person present is armed and dangerous. 99 The Supreme
Court refused to address this issue in Guy v. Wisconsin;4° ° only Jus-
tices White and Thomas, in their dissent from the Court's denial of
certiorari, thought assessing danger in this context was necessary to
resolve the sharp conflict in the lower courts.4 10 Some courts uphold
these types of frisks by automatically drawing two inferences: people
present must have some involvement with drugs and people involved
with drugs often possess weapons.4 °2 Other courts, however, hold that
a person's mere presence at a searched place is too tenuous a connec-
396. Id. The court upheld the frisk of a person who exited a bar with a drink in one
hand and his hand in his pocket:
The officer appreciated the risk involved if indeed there was some criminal intent
on the part of the four men. The officer also surmised, in the alternative, that the
three men and the police might be in danger if the [suspect] had ill intent and was
actually armed. The fact that he kept his right hand in his pocket at all times,
given the surrounding circumstances, was reason enough to suspect [him] of pos-
sibly being armed and warranted the pat down frisk for the officers' and, possibly,
the bystanders' safety.
Id. The court thus found that a frisk was permissible in part because of the danger
presented by four individuals and in part because of the need to protect three of those
same individuals.
397. United States v. Villanueva, 15 F.3d 197, 199 (1st Cir. 1994) (disorderly conduct by
suspect increases sense of danger); Michelletti, 991 F.2d at 185 (suspect had "a bit of a
cocky attitude").
398. Villanueva, 15 F.3d at 199 ("With the plethora of gun carrying, particularly by the
young, we must have sympathy, to an extent, with police officers' apprehension."). In Vil-
lanueva, the First Circuit noted that baggy clothing can increase an officer's sense of dan-
ger: "While defendant's clothing was in current style, and so could not affirmatively be
held against him, its capacity for concealment was not irrelevant." Id. (citations omitted).
The type of clothing that the suspects were wearing thus became one fact increasing the
officer's sense of danger.
399. See United States v. Reid, 997 F.2d 1576, 1577, 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (upholding
frisk of person who had just left an apartment that the officers were just about to search;
court determined that an officer reasonably believed that he was in danger by having the
person "behind" him as he executed the search warrant for drugs).
400. 113 S. Ct. 3020, 3021 (1993).
401. Id.
402. Id. (collecting cases).
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tion to drug activity.4"3 The central issue in this disagreement is the
court's assessment of danger.
A person present when officers conduct protective sweeps while
executing an arrest warrant may also be subject to frisking. In a pro-
tective sweep, officers search an area rather than a person. To frisk a
person at the scene, officers must have a reasonable suspicion that the
person present poses a danger. Some courts believe the presence of
drugs justifies such searches'(' while other courts believe the connec-
tion between drugs and danger is too remote to justify a search of
persons present.40 5
Courts will consider all the facts known to an officer in determin-
ing whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion to believe that
either a search of an area or a person was necessary. While many
courts refrain from finding a single fact dispositive, they nevertheless
use common circumstances such as a high-crime area or the lateness
of the hour to create an inference of danger. When officers frisk indi-
viduals or search areas, courts seem to easily conclude that the requi-
site danger was present. Such conclusions are often rooted in the
need for officers to take preventive actions to minimize the harm to
themselves and sometimes to others. This deference is also apparent
when courts evaluate the means officers use during Terry stops.
B. Preventive Actions During Terry Stops
An officer's perception of danger determines whether an officer
may constitutionally execute a Terry stop. As with the use of force to
arrest a suspect, reasonableness is the standard, and courts view this
403. Id. (collecting cases).
404. See, e.g., United States v. Home, 4 F.3d 579, 586 (8th Cir. 1993) (Protective sweep
was permissible because officers, while executing a search warrant for a fugitive at a home
where drugs had been previously seized, "had no way of knowing how many people were
there."); United States v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 126, 131 n. 20 (5th Cir. 1992) (valid search of
pouch in a car because "[w]eapons and violence are frequently associated with drug
transactions").
405. See, e.g., United States v. McQuagge, 787 F. Supp. 637, 654-55 (E.D. Tex. 1991)
(search of van was not a protective sweep). A federal district court in McQuagge explicitly
rejected the link between drugs and weapons:
The Court has ... repeatedly repudiated the notion that peace officers can as-
sume danger merely from the nature of a crime, the area in which the confronta-
tion occurred, or the likelihood of danger in a situation. These pronouncements
similarly mandate that this court reject the idea that the peace officers can assume
danger merely because many, or even most drug dealers are armed and
dangerous.
Id. at 654. Thus, the court did not infer that because a suspect was involved with drugs he
had a gun in his van.
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standard with the same focus-danger to the officers. In evaluating
whether an officer used unreasonable force, most courts have applied
the factors to distinguish Terry stops from arrests. The Seventh Cir-
cuit,4°6 however, has also considered the three factors detailed in Gra-
ham v. Connor: the type of crime, the threat to officers and others,
and the suspect's resistance and ffight.4 °7 Examination of the methods
officers use to execute Terry stops reveals that the perception of dan-
ger has permitted officers to use psychologically and physically intru-
sive force during Terry stops.
Most courts analyze the totality of the circumstances to evaluate
whether the actions of police officers during Terry stops were reason-
able.408 The Eighth Circuit 40 9 has specified factors, which other courts
have also applied,410 to evaluate an officer's use of force:
the number of officers and police cars involved, the nature of
the crime and whether there is reason to believe the suspect
might be armed, the strength of the officers' articulable, objec-
tive suspicions, the erratic behavior of or suspicious movements
by the persons under observation, and the need for immediate
action by the officers and lack of opportunity for them to have
made the stop in less threatening circumstances.41'
406. See, e.g., United States v. Weaver, 8 F.3d 1240, 1244 (7th Cir. 1993) (tackling sus-
pect during stop was reasonable); Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952, 958 (7th Cir. 1992) (hand-
cuffing during stop was reasonable).
407. Professor Richard Williamson has also properly noted that the means officers use
during Terry stops should be evaluated in light of the Fourth Amendment standard articu-
lated in Tennessee v. Garner. Richard A. Williamson, The Virtues (and Limits) of Shared
Values: The Fourth Amendment and Miranda's Concept of Custody, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv.
379,403 (1993) ("Just as killing a fleeing felon suspect under certain conditions may consti-
tute an unreasonable means of seizing a person, so too would the use of excessive force or
other debilitating tactics-such as handcuffing-during the period of a nonarrest
detention.").
408. See, e.g., United States v. Perea, 986 F.2d 633, 644-45 (2d Cir. 1993); United States
v. Harrington, 923 F.2d 1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 164 (1991);
United States v. Jones, 759 F.2d 633, 638 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 837 (1985).
409. Jones, 759 F.2d at 638-40.
410. See, eg., Perea, 986 F.2d at 644-45. The Second Circuit in Perea listed the following
factors to aid courts in distinguishing arrests from stops:
The amount of force used by police, the need for such force, and the extent to
which the individual's freedom of movement was restrained, and in particular
such factors as the number of agents involved; whether the target of the stop was
suspected of being armed; the duration of the stop; the physical treatment of the
suspect, including whether or not handcuffs were used.
Id. at 645 (citations omitted). The court stated that if the force used was too intrusive for a
stop, then the suspect was de facto arrested. Id. Accord United States v. Hastamorir, 881
F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1989).
411. Jones, 759 F.2d at 639-40.
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These factors raise many of the same factual issues that courts con-
sider when officers act aggressively and use force to arrest a suspect:
the alleged crime committed, the need to act quickly for protection,
and the suspect's resistance and furtive gestures. In analyzing the
methods police use to execute a Terry stop, courts grant broad defer-
ence to police officers' decisions. During Terry stops, police officers
are required to use means that quickly "confirm or dispel their suspi-
cions, '4 12 some courts have interpreted the United States Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Sharpe413 as requiring minimal
scrutiny. In Sharpe, the Court stated that courts should not indulge in
unrealistic second-guessing:
The fact that the protection of the public might, in the abstract,
have been accomplished by "less intrusive" means does not, by
itself render the search unreasonable. The question is not sim-
ply whether some other alternative was available, but whether
the police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize it or to pur-
sue it.
41 4
As with the force used during arrests, reasonableness is the touch-
stone for evaluating the use of force during Terry stops.
As a result of this perceived deference and danger, courts usually
uphold Terry stops, even though the officers used intrusive means gen-
erally associated only with arrests.415 In executing Terry stops, officers
have pointed guns at suspects,4 16 handcuffed 417 and tackled sus-
412. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985).
413. 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
414. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 687 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973)).
415. See, e.g., United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1224-25 (7th Cir. 1994) ("For bet-
ter or for worse, the trend has led to the permitting of the use of handcuffs, the placing of
suspects in police cruisers, the drawing of weapons and other measures either of force
more traditionally associated with arrest than with investigatory detention."); United
States v. Harrington, 923 F.2d 1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 164 (1991)
("Use of force during a Terry stop does not convert the stop into an arrest if the force is
justified by concern for the safety of the officer or others.").
416. See, e.g., Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1227 ("'It is not nice to have a gun pointed at you by a
policeman but it is worse to have a gun pointed at you by a criminal, so there is a complex
tradeoff involved in any proposal to reduce (or increase) the permissible scope of investi-
gatory stops."') (quoting United States v. Serna-Barreto, 842 F.2d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 1988));
United States v. Garza, 10 F.3d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1993) ("Courts have generally upheld
... stops 'with weapons drawn."') (quoting United States v. Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 357
(6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S 1097 (1987)); United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455,
1463 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Although effectuating a Terry stop by pointing guns at a suspect
may elevate a seizure to an 'arrest' in most scenarios, it was not unreasonable under these
circumstances."); Sanders, 994 F.2d at 205 ("Other circuits have held uniformly that, in and
of itself, the mere act of drawing or pointing a weapon during an investigatory detention
does not cause it to exceed the permissible bounds of a Terry stop or to become a de facto
arrest.") (collecting cases). But see People v. Hampton, 606 N.Y.S.2d 628, 630 (N.Y. App.
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pects, 418 compelled suspects to lie on the ground,419 and put suspects
in police cruisers. 420 Although the courts have not created per se rules
Div. 1994) (both stop and frisk were invalid; officer, who thought a cab driver was being
robbed in a high-crime area, impermissibly pointed his gun at a suspect).
417. See, eg., Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1228 ("Handcuffing-once highly problematic-is be-
coming quite acceptable in the context of a Terry analysis."); United States v. Wilson, 2
F.3d 226, 232 (7th Cir. 1993). The Seventh Circuit in Wilson upheld the officer's decision
to handcuff a suspect during a Terry stop because of its assessment of danger:
[T]he encounter occurred in the dead of night in a residential community. We
have no information about how well illumined the area was, but it is safe to as-
sume that the hour considerably increased the potential danger level. Further-
more, when he finally accosted [the suspect], [the officer] was not accompanied
by other officers. The suspect was hiding under a porch and the officer ordered
him to crawl out. At this point, we believe that the officer was justified in hand-
cuffing [the suspect] in the interest of his own safety and the safety of anyone else
who might have been in the area.
Id. The court upheld the use of handcuffs, even though it did not know the officer's ability
to see the suspect, nor what crime the person had allegedly committed. Other courts have
similarly upheld the use of handcuffs during Terry stops as sound preventive measures. See
Sanders, 994 F.2d at 205 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701,708 (9th Cir. 1983))
(Handcuffing in some circumstances is permissible even though "it substantially aggravates
the intrusiveness and is not typically part of a Terry stop."); United States v. Miller, 974
F.2d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1992) (Handcuffing is permissible because the "suspects in the vicin-
ity outnumbered the officers by six to three" and because the officers had reason to believe
that the suspects were involved in drug trafficking.); United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d
326, 329 (4th Cir. 1989).
418. Voida, 963 F.2d at 958.
419. See, ag., Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1228 ("When a suspect is considered dangerous, re-
quiring him to lie face down on the ground is the safest way for police officers to approach
him, handcuff him and finally determine whether he carries any weapons."); United States
v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1463 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Directing the suspect to lie on the ground
provided the officers with a better view of the suspect and prevented him from obtaining
weapons which might have been in the car or on his person."); Courson v. McMillian, 939
F.2d 1479, 1496 (11th Cir. 1991) (officer reasonably ordered passenger in car to lie on the
ground because her companions were difficult to handle). The Fifth Circuit in Sanders
found reasonable an officer's decision to force a suspect to lie on the ground while pointing
a gun at him:
Admittedly, being held at gunpoint by the police would be a powerful incentive
for most persons neither to flee nor resist an impending investigation. Such a
situation is not, however, equally inspirational for everyone. For example, some
individuals will be sufficiently familiar with police procedures to believe that the
officer will not actually use deadly force against them-particularly in close prox-
imity to innocent bystanders-or will be so hesitant to use force that the suspect
can "get the jump" on the officer. Others, such as persons who have been con-
suming drugs or alcoholic beverages, might misjudge the gravity of the situation
or might be confused as to which responses on their part are or are not appropri-
ate. A third group will be so desperate to avoid apprehension that they will
knowingly take any risk to evade the police.
Sanders, 994 F.2d at 207. Although the court refused to create a rule automatically justify-
ing such use of force, it may offer similar conjectures in other cases. Id. at 206.
420. See, e.g., United States v. Cannon, 15 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 1994) (having suspect
sit in cruiser was a "reasonable precautionary measure" as the officer did a computer
check).
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allowing officers to always use these means,421 they often perceive suf-
ficient danger to justify these actions. For example, the Seventh Cir-
cuit 4 2 2 stated that even if the force used was too intrusive for a Terry
stop, the force may nevertheless be reasonable depending on the "de-
gree of suspicion" and the "duration of restraint."'4  The court im-
plied that a continuum of force exists for Terry stops as well as arrests:
if officers lack probable cause for an arrest, but use more force than
permitted for a Terry stop, the force used may nevertheless be reason-
able, depending upon the officer's suspicion and the degree of
intrusion.424
Most courts uphold the use of intrusive means to execute a Terry
stop. Although the means officers use during these stops can be psy-
chologically jarring, the implicit message of many courts is that these
means are designed to prevent further harm to the officer, suspect,
and perhaps the community. They very easily perceive danger when
officers act preventively.
In addition to analyzing danger associated with Terry stops and
arrests, courts also consider danger the key issue in determining
whether officers may enter a home without a warrant to aid someone
during emergencies. How courts assess danger in this context is im-
portant because the home, unlike other places, signifies a profound
expectation of privacy, an expectation worthy of consideration in bal-
ancing interests under the Fourth Amendment.
C. Rescue Actions: Emergencies as Inherent Danger
Occasionally, police officers claim the use of aggressive action
was necessary to protect the community from harm. In these in-
stances, officers perform "community caretaking" functions, as first
discussed by the Supreme Court in Cady v. Dombrowski.42 5 In Cady,
the Court held that officers who are not suspicious of any criminal
activity may still act to protect the public if their actions are reason-
able within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.426 Courts disa-
gree regarding the degree of danger that must be present to justify
421. See, e.g., Sanders, 994 F.2d at 206.
422. Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1226 (court adopted a "sliding scale" to evaluate how intrusive
police means may be under certain circumstances).
423. Id. (quoting United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193, 1198 (7th Cir. 1990), cert
denied, 502 U.S. 872 (1991)).
424. Id.
425. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
426. Id. at 446-47.
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these suspicionless seizures, and do not uniformly weigh the interests
of the seized individual, society, and the need for caretaking.
The court's assessment of danger was key to the resolution of the
motion to suppress evidence at O.J. Simpson's preliminary hearing.42 7
The court's ruling centered on whether the detectives who entered
Mr. Simpson's home reasonably believed that an emergency ex-
isted.42s To support its conclusion that an emergency existed, the
court detailed its findings of fact, stating that the definition of an
"emergency" is "a gray area of the law."4 29
In the Simpson case, detectives went to Mr. Simpson's house af-
ter observing the bloody crime scene of the murder of Nicole Brown
Simpson and Ronald Goldman.43 ° The court concluded that the
detectives initially went to the house for two reasons: to inform Mr.
Simpson of the deaths and to have him assume responsibility for his
two children, who had been taken to the police station.43' After ring-
ing the doorbell for fifteen minutes and noticing that lights were on
inside the house and vehicles were parked in the driveway, they called
Mr. Simpson's home security company.432 When the security com-
pany arrived and provided the detectives with Mr. Simpson's number,
a detective called and got the answering machine.4 33 Then a detective
noticed blood on a vehicle rented by Mr. Simpson.434 Based on these
facts, the court determined that it was reasonable to believe that an
emergency existed, which justified a detective climbing a wall that sur-
rounded three residences.435
The court also held that the emergency authorized a detective to
enter Simpson's guest quarters and speak with a man who stated that
he had heard a loud noise earlier that had worried him.436 The detec-
tive then examined tennis shoes found in the guest room. 437 The court
found this action was reasonable because an emergency still existed.438
According to the court, the detective could examine the shoes because
427. Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, People v. Simpson, BA097211, July 7, 1994
(available on Prodigy).
428. Id at *1.
429. Id.
430. Id. at *2.
431. Id.
432. Id. at *3.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id. at *6.
436. Id.
437. Id. at *4.
438. Id.
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he had previously seen bloody footprints at the crime scene.439 Yet in
justifying the officer's other actions, the court linked each action to
the detectives' goal of locating people in the houses who could have
been harmed by the killer.440 Thus, the Court believed that the of-
ficers actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the of-
ficers reasonably believed that other people could have been in
danger.441
Other courts have also allowed police officers to enter homes to
provide aid to a person," 2 to search for unknown victims,44 3 and to
seize weapons that are a potential danger to residents. 4 Other
courts, however, more closely scrutinized the entering of a home.445
Courts have also recognized that police officers may perform
community caretaking functions in other contexts." 6 One court has
439. Id.
440. Id. at *5-6.
441. Id. at *6.
442. See, e.g., Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 211 (D.C. App. 1963) (need to give
aid to unconscious person); State v. Plant, 461 N.W.2d 253, 263 (Neb. 1990) (officer reason-
ably believed that entering house was necessary "for the protection of the three small un-
accounted-for children"); Duquette v. Godbout, 471 A.2d 1359, 1362 (R.I. 1984) (A
"distraught mother.., believed [her] child to be in peril within the apartment."). When
officers reasonably believe that an emergency exists, some courts also uphold warrantless
entries on the ground that if they had not acted they would "have been derelict in their
duty in light of all the knowledge they possessed." Plant, 461 N.W.2d at 263.
In Wayne, the District of Columbia Appellate Court stated that courts should defer to
the judgment of police officers in assessing the danger:
People could well die in emergencies if police tried to act with the calm delibera-
tion associated with the judicial process. Even the apparently dead often are
saved by swift police response. A myriad of circumstances . . .[exist:] smoke
coming out of a window or under a door, the sound of gunfire in a house, threats
from the inside to shoot through the door at police, reasonable grounds to believe
that an injured or seriously ill person is being held within.
Wayne, 318 F.2d at 212. In these situations, the court determined that deference is reason-
able. Id. at 214.
443. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 497 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Mich. 1993) (Emergency entries
"need not be subject to traditional probable cause analysis, but.., their legality should be
evaluated on the basis of whether the police 'reasonably believed' a person needed aid.").
444. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 764 F.2d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1985) (after son killed
his father on the porch, officer could reasonably enter house to retrieve the gun put in the
house by a bystander); State v. Illig, 467 N.W.2d 375,382 (Neb. 1991) (person in house shot
person on porch; officer reasonably entered the house and seized gun in the house to "pro-
tect the lives" of those near and "to determine if there were any other victims").
445. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 497 N.W.2d 910, 920-21 (Mich. 1993) (officers who en-
tered a motel room after a reported shooting should have asked desk clerk in which room
the shooting had occurred; level of intrusiveness is a factor in determining the reasonable-
ness of emergency assistance).
446. See, e.g., In re Forfeiture of $176,598, 505 N.W.2d 201, 207 (Mich. 1993) (The fol-
lowing are emergencies: "remov[ing] a former girlfriend following a domestic dispute, re-
moving an intoxicated person from the street, entering an abandoned boat to ascertain
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interpreted the Fourth Amendment to severely limit an officer's abil-
ity to perform "welfare stops." 7  The Utah Court of Appeals in
Provo City v. Warden448 stated that in some circumstances officers
may perform suspicionless seizures to assist citizens. In balancing the
Fourth Amendment interests, the court stated that such seizures are
permissible only when "the circumstances demonstrate an imminent
danger to life or limb."449 The court found that the facts of the case
signified danger because the officer acted on information from two
individuals that a driver planned to commit suicide. The Court's deci-
sion paid great deterrence to a citizen's right to privacy and personal
security.450 This deference, the court reasoned, was necessary to pro-
hibit "pretextual police activities. 451 Other courts, though not specif-
ically limiting stops related to imminent danger, have stated that
serious safety concerns would justify an officer's suspicionless
intrusion.5 2
Other courts, however, appear to trust that police officers per-
form such acts out of concern for citizens rather than as a subterfuge
seizure or search.45 3 These courts have not interpreted reasonable-
ness to require danger to a person's life or bodily integrity. These
courts consider all of the circumstances to determine whether the aid
ownership and the safety of the mariners, [and] searching an unconscious person for iden-
tification.") (footnotes omitted).
447. See, e.g., Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App. 1992), af'd, No.
930059, 1994 WL 257117 (Utah June 10, 1994).
448. Id.
449. Id. at 364.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. See, e.g., United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1560-63 (10th Cir. 1993) (police
officer, who was about to ask driver at jammed intersection to quit honking, could ask him
to leave his car upon seeing a loaded weapon in the car; officer erred in drawing her
weapon, in a state where citizens may carry guns, and threatening to kill him if he failed to
follow her order); United States v. Dunbar, 470 F. Supp. 704, 707 (D. Conn. 1979), affid,
610 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1979). The district court stated that the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment was "to minimize governmental confrontations with the individual." 470 F.
Supp. at 708. It nevertheless held that suspicionless stops were permissible when the of-
ficers would be providing significant aid to an individual:
The most rigorous view of the Fourth Amendment would not bar police officers
from stopping a motorist to inform him that a bridge beyond a bend in the road
had just been washed away. Some might contend that, as soon as time permitted,
even this situation could be handled less intrusively by placing barricades to close
the road, but a stopping of cars to warn and suggest alternate routes scarcely
seems unreasonable.
Id. at 707. The court thus recognized that in emergencies police officers may seize individ-
uals without reasonable suspicion.
453. See infra text accompanying notes 454-459.
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was reasonable. For example, some courts have found the following
stops of drivers to reasonable caretaking actions: stopping those who
have mist on their rear windows,4 54 those who are driving on the
shoulder of a road late at night with a flashing turn signal,455 and those
who slow down in a turn lane and roll down their window when near
an officer.456 In addition, one court remanded so the trial court could
determine whether an officer acted reasonably in stopping a driver to
prevent a hat from blowing out of the driver's truck.457 In resolving
the issue of reasonableness, one court45 8 stated that it must consider
whether alternatives were available to the officer to provide the aid.459
Even courts that use a general reasonableness standard occasion-
ally strike down alleged "caretaking" actions. Some courts find it is
unreasonable to stop a driver to discuss possible past parking viola-
tions,460 to finish a previously consensual conversation,' or to give
directions to someone who appears lost.462 These courts find the ac-
tion by the police officers unreasonable because of the slight weight
they give to the interest in helping individuals under these circum-
stances and the great weight accorded to a citizen's interest in per-
sonal security and privacy.
Determining what constitutes an emergency thus requires consid-
eration of the presence of danger. Some courts require significant dan-
ger while other courts look at the circumstances to determine whether
the aid was reasonable. In deriving these different standards, the
courts implicitly disagree regarding whether the Fourth Amendment
presumptively trusts the officers' decisions to search and seize
individuals.
D. Protective Searches Incident to Lawful Arrests: Brightline Fictions
Officers can justify a search incident to a suspect's arrest in three
situations: to protect the officer as he takes a suspect into custody, to
454. Russell v. Municipality of Anchorage, 706 P.2d 687, 688 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
455. State v. Goetaski, 507 A.2d 751, 752 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
456. Crauthers v. State, 727 P.2d 9, 10 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
457. State v. Chisholm, 696 P.2d 41, 42 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
458. State v. Anderson, 439 N.W.2d 840, 848 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other
grounds, 454 N.W.2d 763 (Wis. 1990).
459. Id. (Court is to consider "the availability, feasibility and effectiveness of alterna-
tives to the type of intrusion actually accomplished.").
460. Id. at 847.
461. McDougal v. State, 580 So.2d 324, 324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
462. United States v. Dunbar, 470 F. Supp. 704, 707 (D. Conn. 1979), affd 610 F.2d 807
(2d Cir. 1979).
Spring 19951 THE USE OF FORCE BY POLICE OFFICERS 689
limit escapes, and to prevent the destruction of evidence.463 When
courts uphold these searches, they rarely specify how the searches fur-
thered these justifications. The only issues generally mentioned under
this doctrine are whether the areas searched were within the suspect's
control and whether the search was contemporaneous with the arrest.
Two of these doctrinal elements, however, have become meaningless
for many courts. Instead of analyzing the facts of a particular case,
courts have upheld searches even though the facts do not support the
justification for the search.
The most blatant disregard of the facts has centered on the sus-
pect's immediate control of evidence of weapons. Courts have cre-
ated a fiction that suspects have access when they do not. Courts have
upheld the following searches: searches of a suspect's vehicle, even
though at the time of the search the suspect was detained in a police
cruiser;4 " searches of the suspect's car, even though the suspect was
shot, handcuffed, and surrounded by police officers;465 searches be-
hind a dresser, even though it was unlikely that the suspect could have
reached behind the dresser; 66 searches of a closet, even though the
suspect was handcuffed and surrounded by police officers;467 searches
of handbags and suitcases held by the suspect at time of his arrest,
even though the officer seized them upon arrest.468  These bizarre
interpretations of the search incident to an arrest doctrine indicate
absolute deference to the officer's decision to search an area. Only a
few courts have placed realistic boundaries on this discretion."49
463. See supra notes 163-165 and accompanying text.
464. See, e.g., United States v. Lugo, 978 F.2d 631, 634-35 (10th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Karlin, 852 F.2d 968, 971 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1021 (1989); Davis
v. Robbs, 794 F.2d 1129, 1130-31 (6th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 992 (1986).
465. See, eg., State v. Calovine, 579 A.2d 126, 128 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990).
466. United States v. Palumbo, 735 F.2d 1095, 1097 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 934 (1984).
467. United States v. Queen, 847 F.2d 346, 353-55 (7th Cir. 1988).
468. United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Morales, 923 F.2d 621, 627 (8th Cir. 1991).
469. See, e.g., United States v. Lugo, 978 F.2d 631, 634-35 (10th Cir. 1992) (invalid
search because "[o]nce [the suspect] had been taken from the scene, there was obviously
no threat that he might reach in his vehicle and grab a weapon or destroy evidence");
United States v. Fafowora, 865 F.2d 360, 362 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S 829 (1989)
(police officers who approach individuals outside their vehicle may not search the car);
United States v. Cotton, 751 F.2d 1146, 1148 (10th Cir. 1985) (search may be broader when
officers search vehicles as opposed to other areas because of the diminished expectation of
privacy); United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321, 330 n. 12 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (once police have
control of an object and "there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access
to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no
longer incident to the arrest.").
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Several courts explicitly state that officers need not closely ex-
amine the facts of a particular case to determine whether the suspect
had actual access to the searched area.47 A search may be reasonable
even if access was "slight."47 Although one court stated that an of-
ficer should not consider a suspect to be either "'an acrobat"' or
"'Houdini, '"'472 searches are routinely upheld that require such rare
physical skills. Similarly, some courts fail to give meaning to the doc-
trinal requirement that searches must be contemporaneous with
arrests.473
Prior to the embedding of these fictions in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, some circuits examined the totality of the cir-
cumqtances to assess actual access.474 The standard for this assess-
ment was similar to the standard for analyzing the means officers use
during Terry stops. For example, the Ninth Circuit475 considered the
number of suspects and officers, the suspects' location, and the use of
guns. This totality of circumstances standard, however, later gave way
to the fiction, which did not require actual access.
470. See, e.g., United States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501, 1506-07 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990). In Arango, the Seventh Circuit described this common
deference:
[The law] does not require the arresting officer to undergo a detailed analysis, at
the time of arrest, of whether the arrestee, handcuffed or not, could reach into the
car to seize some item within, either as a weapon or to destroy evidence, or for
some altogether different reason. The facts surrounding each arrest are unique,
and it is not by any means inconceivable under those various possibilities that an
arrestee could gain control of some item within the automobile. The law simply
does not require the arresting officer to mentally sift through all these possibilities
during an arrest, before deciding whether he may lawfully search within the
vehicle.
Id. (citing United States v. Cotton, 751 F.2d 1146, 1148 (10th Cir. 1985). See also United
States v. Queen, 847 F.2d 346, 353 (7th Cir. 1988) (courts should not second-guess police
officers because they "cannot be expected to make punctilious judgments regarding what is
within and what is just beyond the arrestee's 'immediate control"').
471. Queen, 847 F.2d at 353 (quoting United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321, 330 (D.C.
Cir. 1983)).
472. United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting United States
v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 80 (2d Cir. 1973)).
473. See, e.g., Karlin, 852 F.2d at 971 (issue is whether suspect had access to area at time
of arrest, not at time of search); Palumbo, 735 F.2d at 1097 (upheld search even though it
was unlikely that suspect had access to area at time of arrest).
474. See, e.g., United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1207 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 824 (1984).
475. Id. Later the Ninth Circuit replaced the actual access standard with a fiction. See
United States v. Tbrner, 926 F.2d 883, 887-88 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 103 (1991).
In Turner, the Ninth Circuit held that officers may search an area if the suspect had access
to it at the time he was arrested, even if later he was removed in handcuffs. Id.
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In determining the constitutionality of searches incident to ar-
rests, some courts have not applied a totality of circumstances stan-
dard. The fiction adopted by some courts is not linked to any of the
justifications supporting the search. Rather, many courts allow these
searches based merely on the belief that police officers should have
broad discretion in deciding whether to search the area.
Although a reasonableness standard does not provide police of-
ficers with bright lines to guide their actions, analyzing circumstances
based upon doctrinal justifications seems to be at least a floor for judi-
cial scrutiny. In assessing the circumstances surrounding preventive
actions by police officers, such as Terry frisks and emergencies, courts
have often fused the issue of reasonableness with the issue of danger.
Often, in the context of searches incident to arrest, the danger analysis
has not only disappeared from the analysis but is nonexistent. The
common thread to these doctrines is the Fourth Amendment reasona-
bleness standard.
VII. Dangerous Misperceptions of the Fourth Amendment:
The Substitution of Judicial Perspective for
Executive Judgments
When police officers strike suspects or act preventively by per-
forming frisks, searches incident to arrests, or community caretaking
functions, the constitutionality of their actions depends upon whether
their actions were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Although in each of these areas the Supreme Court has articulated
doctrinal elements for this reasonableness inquiry, in evaluating the
police conduct, many courts focus almost exclusively on the danger
presented by the situation. This focus has at times resulted in courts
finding the assessment of danger to be synonymous with the reasona-
bleness inquiry. Although the reasonableness inquiry under the
Fourth Amendment is not formulaic, it does include more than an as-
sessment of danger. In addition to society's interest in law enforce-
ment, the reasonableness inquiry encompasses both society's and the
individual's interest in personal security. By centering the inquiry on
the danger presented by circumstances, some courts err by interpret-
ing the Fourth Amendment to require almost absolute deference to an
officer's perception of danger. In doing so, they have often failed to
scrutinize other important aspects of the confrontation: the gravity of
the offense committed by a suspect, the availability of other means to
apprehend the suspect, the role officers played in creating the need for
force, the jury's role in determining what actually happened, and the
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intrusive nature of many preventive actions. This misapplied defer-
ence is pronounced when the circumstances involve a psychologically
disturbed individual, a frisk, a community caretaking function, or a
search incident to an arrest. An examination of each of these mis-
perceptions reveals how courts should interpret the reasonableness
inquiry.
A. Danger is Only a Factor in Determining Reasonableness
The right to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures" is
a right that courts should interpret in light of the history and purpose
of the Fourth Amendment. These two inquiries shape the reasonable-
ness standard and reveal that the assessment of danger is not synony-
mous with the determination of reasonableness. The constitutionality
of a police practice requires consideration of numerous issues, with
the assessment of danger as only a single factor. Although scholars
disagree as to the role the warrant clause plays in the Fourth Amend-
ment analysis, they nevertheless recognize that reasonableness com-
pels consideration of numerous interests.476 Describing and weighing
these interests are key issues in litigation arising from officers' preven-
tive actions and their use of physical force against a suspect.
The Fourth Amendment was designed to protect individuals from
oppressive governmental actions. Because governmental practices
during the colonial era were intrusive and arbitrary, the framers of the
Fourth Amendment erected a shield to protect citizens from unrea-
sonable government actions. After examining this history, Professor
Tracey Maclin soundly concluded that the Reasonableness Clause rep-
resents a mistrust of police power. Evaluating how police officers use
this police power, however, is not limited to examining only those
practices present at common law, because the Framers could not have
intended to freeze from scrutiny newer methods arising from techno-
logical developments. As Professor Carol Steiker has noted, "use of
the term 'reasonable' . .. positively invites constructions that change
with changing circumstances. 477 The history and purpose of the
Amendment thus indicate a need to evaluate police practices to en-
sure they do not unreasonably infringe upon the "right of the people
to be secure."47 8
476. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv.
757, 759-61 (1994); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts about First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REv. 820, 824 (1994).
477. Steiker, supra note 476, at 824.
478. U.S. CONST. Amend. IV.
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Thus, determining the scope of an individual's right to be secure
is the same question as determining what is an unreasonable search or
seizure. Reasonableness emerges as the standard for measuring po-
lice practices. This inquiry, however, requires a balancing of interests,
not a quick glance to determine if the practices are rational. Although
reasonableness as a standard cannot be precisely described, the his-
tory and purpose of the Amendment should nevertheless guide how
courts identify and weigh the interests.
Balancing interests under the Fourth Amendment, as with bal-
ancing interests under other amendments, is a process linked to per-
ceived values represented in the Amendment. In the context of
aggressive actions against suspects, the United States Supreme Court
in Tennessee v. Garner 79 and Graham v. Connor480 emphasized the
importance of personal security both to the individual seized and to
society. In Garner, the Court valued highly an individual's right to life
and society's interest in a fair adjudication of guilt.48 It held that in
some situations these interests outweigh society's interest in effective
law enforcement.' 8 It thus held that officers may act unreasonably
when they shoot fleeing felons. Similarly, in Graham, the Court de-
tailed three factors that help to measure the degree of intrusiveness of
police practices: the crime committed, the immediacy of harm to of-
ficers or the community, and the suspect's resistance.48 3 In listing
these factors, the Court offered guidelines to evaluate police practices.
The Court in Terry v. Ohio also described the importance of the
right to personal security as it upheld an officer's limited ability to
frisk suspects.4 4 It stated, "[A frisk] is a serious intrusion upon the
sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse
strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly. '485 It held
that this preventive action, one not designed to inflict bodily injury,
must be carefully limited to the need to protect officers from armed
and dangerous suspects.4 86 Only under these circumstances would the
Fourth Amendment permit officers to pat down a suspect because the
right to personal security "belongs as much to the citizen on the
479. 471 U.S. at 11-12.
480. 490 U.S. at 395 ("'[R]easonableness' of a particular seizure depends not only on
when it is made, but also on how it is carried out.").
481. Garner, 471 U.S. at 9.
482. Id. at 19.
483. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
484. Terry, 392 U.S. at 8.
485. Id. at 17.
486. Id. at 26.
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streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dis-
pose of his secret affairs. 487 This right thus broadly protects both
bodily integrity and privacy.
However, when interpreting these decisions, some lower courts,
have misunderstood the reasonableness inquiry. They have inter-
preted the Court's discussion of.danger in Garner, Graham, and Terry
as the standard for measuring reasonableness. In doing so, they have
shifted the balance to the goal of promoting law enforcement. Woe-
fully absent from this perspective is a recognition of the history of the
Fourth Amendment. If mistrust of police power was the impetus for
passage of the Fourth Amendment, then interpreting the Fourth
Amendment to strongly further law enforcement interests makes no
sense. Thus, balancing requires evaluating conflicting interests, not
just discerning the presence of danger. When courts focus their atten-
tion solely on the issue of danger, they fail to consider other interests
furthered by the Fourth Amendment.
B. The Gravity of the Offense is a Factor in Determining
Reasonableness
An important factor in the calculation of reasonableness is the
offense the suspect allegedly committed, which compelled an investi-
gation, an attempt to apprehend, or any protective measure. The
Supreme Court explicitly mentioned this factor in both Garner and
Graham as it described how to evaluate the use of force by police
officers.' 88 It also stated in Wisconsin v. Welsh48 9 that the gravity of
the offense is an important factor in determining the presence of exi-
gent circumstances. In Terry, the Court also used the nature of the
suspected offense, armed robbery, as a factor in determining whether
the investigating officer could have believed that the suspect was
armed and dangerous.490
In assessing the use of force against suspects, many courts have
failed to consider the nature of the alleged offense. They have instead
focused on two issues: the threat posed by the suspect and the sus-
pect's resistance. They have interpreted these factors as creating a
"dangerousness" standard. Such an interpretation, however, is mis-
guided. The second Graham factor questions not only whether there
was a threat, but also if the threat was present at the time the officer
487. Id. at 9.
488. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11; Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
489. 466 U.S. 740, 752 (1984).
490. Terry, 392 U.S. at 28.
acted. This immediacy requirement limits the use of force by focusing
on the force actually necessary. Similarly, the third factor simply
questions whether the suspect resisted. It does not necessarily imply
that all resistance must be checked by ever increasing uses of force.
These erroneous interpretations do not adequately consider the
first factor listed in Graham: the crime the person allegedly committed
that required police officers to seize him. If an eleven-year-old boy
stole a pair of sunglasses from a discount store and resisted the of-
ficers' commands to stop, should they tackle him and use pain compli-
ance techniques to control him, if they know the boy, where he lives
and that their actions may incite nearby youths observing the confron-
tation? Because the Reasonableness Clause requires a balancing of
interests, such an action is unreasonable in light of the offense com-
mitted and the surrounding circumstances.
The significance of the crime allegedly committed depends upon
the circumstances of the confrontation between the officer and sus-
pect. For example, if a childless suspect has just killed his wife, he has
just committed a crime involving the "serious infliction of bodily in-
jury." A literal reading of this language from Garner might seem to
suggest that officers could automatically shoot him when they see him.
Yet, under some circumstances he may not pose an immediate danger
to anyone else. In short, even though he committed a heinous act, he
may not be an immediate threat to anyone else. He may have already
killed the only person that was logically at risk. Although he may
pose a threat to himself, it would be unreasonable to kill him unless
the surrounding circumstances change drastically to signify an imme-
diate danger to police officers and the community. By barring officers
from shooting, both the suspect's right to personal security and soci-
ety's interest in a fair adjudication of his guilt are preserved.
The focus on danger analysis perhaps has risen from reliance on
the continuum-of-force model for apprehending suspects. Many of-
ficers are trained to escalate the degree of force if a suspect resists
their commands. The continuum itself does not signify that there ever
is any need to let the suspect go. Only at the end of the continuum,
which authorizes the use of deadly force, is there a check, one estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner. In the nondeadly
force context, officers may be constitutionally required to let suspects
go rather than use escalating force.
The balance of interests, represented by the reasonableness stan-
dard, at times should limit the use of nondeadly force in apprehending
suspects, even when they flee. An interest that sometimes tilts the
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balance toward allowing flight is the individual's right to bodily integ-
rity. Although the dissent in Garner argued that all suspects can
maintain this interest by stopping,4 91 the majority properly interpreted
the balancing process to protect a suspect's fundamental interest in his
life.492 The suspect in Garner was not required to stop for the Consti-
tution to protect this interest. Although one's interest in life is signifi-
cantly stronger than one's interest in bodily integrity, the balancing
process should question whether at times this interest, as in Garner,
outweighs the interest in law enforcement. By considering the nature
of the alleged offense, courts and officers can better distinguish the
scope of reasonable conduct. Determining when police officers
should cease using nonlethal force and let a suspect flee is also linked
to the availability of alternative means to seize suspects. This issue,
like the alleged offense, is also frequently ignored by courts.
C. Judicial Scrutiny Does Not Constitute Impermissible Second-
Guessing of Police Officers' Split-Second Judgments
Courts often fail to consider the availability of alternative means
of action because of an implicit belief that such scrutiny constitutes
impermissible second-guessing of officers' split-second judgments.
Such broad-ranging deference, however, is inappropriate and contrary
to our well-established doctrine of judicial review. Analyzing the
availability of alternative means should be an important factor in de-
termining reasonableness.
It is difficult to understand the role of available alternatives be-
cause the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed this issue.
When considering some preventive actions, the Court has not care-
fully evaluated available alternatives. However, in the seminal deci-
sions of Garner and Terry, the Court limited the means officers could
employ when investigating and apprehending suspects.493 Scrutiny of
means, however, does not necessarily require identifying the least in-
trusive practice. It entails consideration of whether the police practice
was reasonable in light of available alternatives.
One of the Court's most deferential opinions addressing preven-
tive actions is Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 494 in which the
Court held that police officers may stop drivers at roadblocks for the
purpose of determining whether they are intoxicated. The Court up-
491. Garner, 471 U.S. at 29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
492. Id. at 9.
493. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12; Terry, 392 U.S. at 26.
494. 496 U.S 444, 447-55 (1990).
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held the practice as a safety measure, which allows officers to seize
individuals even though they have no reason to believe they are intox-
icated.495 In balancing the interests of the parties, the Court deter-
mined that this practice compelled a driver to stop for only a few
seconds, that the police officers' actions were not arbitrary, that drunk
driving was a serious problem, and that roadblocks were an "effec-
tive" means of stopping drunk drivers.496 Although the Court explic-
itly evaluated the means used by the officers, it was reluctant to
subject the means to heightened review. It stated, "[F]or the purposes
of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among such reasonable al-
ternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a unique
understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, in-
cluding a finite number of police officers. '497 It nevertheless deter-
mined that the practice was reasonable. It merely refused to decide
which plan for stopping drunk driving was "ideal."498
The Court in other preventive decisions has expressed a reluc-
tance for close scrutiny of means. In Cady v. Dombrowski499 and
Pennsylvania v. Mimms,50 ° the Court held that a police officer's deci-
sion to search a towed car for a gun and to order a suspect out of a car
during a traffic stop was reasonable. In Cady, the Court examined
community safety;501 however, in Mimms, the issue was the officer's
safety.50z In both decisions, the Court did not determine the least in-
trusive means available.50 3
When the practice involves, however, serious infringements of
bodily integrity and privacy, the Court is more willing to closely evalu-
ate the means. For example, Garner limited the use of deadly force,5°
Graham limited the use of nondeadly force,505 Terry limited the na-
ture of a frisk,506 and Winston v. Lee50 7 limited the government's abil-
495. Id. at 435.
496. Id.
497. Id. at 453-54.
498. Id. at 453.
499. 413 U.S. 433, 446 (1973).
500. 434 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1977).
501. Cady, 413 U.S. at 447.
502. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111.
503. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Set-
ting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 1173,
1176 (1988) ("The Court's fourth amendment balancing analyses have neither systemati-
cally evaluated the marginal law enforcement benefits of challenged searches and seizures,
nor regularly incorporated the 'least intrusive alternative' requirement.").
504. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.
505. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.
506. Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-27.
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ity to obtain evidence by performing surgery on a suspect. The
heightened scrutiny of means in these situations is proper because po-
lice practices significantly intrudes upon bodily security and privacy.
When the balance is so heavily weighted against the police prac-
tice, the lack of alternatives is an important issue. In this situation, the
lack of another alternative is relevant, but not dispositive, of the rea-
sonableness question. For example, in Garner, the Court barred kill-
ing the fleeing burglary suspect, even though it assumed that the
officers would not apprehend him later.50 8 Similarly, in Winston, the
Court barred surgery to remove a bullet from the suspect, even
though it was the only way to retrieve this evidence.50 9 The availabil-
ity of alternatives thus becomes one issue in the reasonableness in-
quiry, and its significance depends upon the circumstances of each
case.
D. Conduct Prior to a Seizure May Be Relevant in Determining
Reasonableness
Examining alternatives requires consideration of when to begin
scrutinizing the means used by officials. This question arises when of-
ficers believe that greater force is necessary because of the suspect's
prior conduct. Some courts limit their scrutiny of means to the point
the officers seized a suspect. Such bright-line temporal limitations,
however, seriously undermine the right to personal security by failing
to consider prior conduct. The confusion as to when to evaluate the
means used by the officers results from the Supreme Court's language
regarding the nature of policing and its incredibly narrowing "seizure"
definitions.
The disagreement as to temporal limitations stems from the
Supreme Court's discussion of policing in Graham. The Graham
Court stated that when courts and juries determine reasonableness,
they should remember that "police officers are often forced to make
split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain,
and rapidly evolving. 510 In examining this language, some courts
confuse the nature of policing with deference to police officers' deci-
sions. Although the Court stated that the dangerous nature of polic-
ing is a factor in determining reasonableness, it did not state that
strong deference is necessary because policing is difficult. Such an in-
507. 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985).
508. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.
509. Winston, 470 U.S. at 766.
510. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
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terpretation fails to take into consideration how police officers are
trained. When police officers practice shooting their weapons, they
often do so in conditions designed to simulate situations requiring
quick judgment. An ability to make quick decisions simply describes
a skill required of police officers. It does not prohibit examining
whether their actions prior to the seizure created the need for force.
Determining how far back in time courts and juries should look
when determining whether officers created the need for force is the
most difficult issue associated with temporal limitations. Although the
moment an officer seizes a suspect seems like a logical starting point,
conduct prior to seizure at times may be significantly linked to the
seizure. Like the classic question of proximate cause, this question is
a policy question implicit in the standard of reasonableness.
The temporal question probably would not exist except for the
Court's ever narrowing seizure definitions. Prior to the Court's
seizure definition in California v. Hodari D.,51n courts more readily
determined that officers had seized suspects by their actions. The
Hodari D. Court drastically limited the circumstances constituting
seizure as it held that a "show of authority" by police officers does not
automatically constitute a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.512 By adding to its definition of seizure that the suspect
must comply with the assertion of authority, the Court moved the
point of seizure further ahead in time.
By considering actions prior to a seizure, courts do not expand
the scope of the Fourth Amendment because only those actions caus-
ally linked with the seizure are relevant to the reasonableness inquiry.
Thus, if the suspect never complied with the show of authority, then
no seizure occurred and the prior conduct is not governed by the
Fourth Amendment. If, however, the officers shot the suspect be-
cause he failed to comply with the show of authority, the officers'
prior actions may be causally linked to the seizure. Considering ac-
tions prior to the seizure may in some circumstances further the con-
stitutional right to personal security, because reasonableness is the
applicable standard and the Federal Rules broadly define relevance.
E. Reasonableness is a Constitutional Standard, Not One Governed
by State Law or National Police Practices
Although the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures, it does not specify how courts should determine
511. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
512. Id. at 625-26.
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reasonableness. Such an open-ended standard invites consideration of
a variety of sources to ascertain its meaning. When courts and juries
determine whether officers violated the Fourth Amendment, they nec-
essarily distinguish a constitutional violation from a state law viola-
tion, such as battery or trespass. This distinction is important when
considering the role of experts in determining the reasonableness of a
police practice. Although their testimony may be relevant to resolve
reasonableness, their opinion does not resolve the Fourth Amend-
ment question.
If policing experts resolved the issue of reasonableness, the judi-
ciary would be stripped of its power to interpret the Constitution. The
Supreme Court, in Garner, recognized its role when it rejected the
well-established police practice of killing fleeing felons.5 13 Although
this practice was established at common law and a majority of police
departments still adhered to the common law rule, the Court never-
theless interpreted the balancing process implicit in the Reasonable-
ness Clause as prohibiting the practice.514 Similarly, in Graham, the
Court affirmed that arbitrary use of physical force does not necessarily
violate the Fourth Amendment.51 5 Arbitrary force must rise to the
level of a constitutional violation to be actionable.
Distinguishing constitutional torts from state torts, however, has
been difficult for courts. Some courts have erroneously interpreted
the Fourth Amendment as creating a negligence standard. Such an
interpretation, however, strips from the Amendment its rich history
that instructs courts and juries to protect the interests of citizens and
society. Even though the Fourth Amendment and negligence claims
both consider the availability of alternatives, they are different.
Although no treatise could clearly delineate how to make this distinc-
tion, courts and juries properly interpret the Fourth Amendment
when they consider the interests it protects. Simple reliance on the
common law or national police standards undervalues the right to per-
sonal security.
F. In Civil Cases Juries Must Often Determine What Constitutes
Objective Reasonableness
Who determines what constitutes objectively reasonable conduct
is an important issue when the Fourth Amendment issue arises in a
513. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.
514. ld.
515. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.
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civil action under section 1983.516 Although courts in criminal cases
find facts during suppression hearings on Fourth Amendment issues,
when civil cases raise Fourth Amendment issues, courts sometimes
misunderstand the objective reasonableness standard.517 Some courts
deprive the jury of its role of determining the facts of the case and
applying the standard of reasonableness.
Although the jury system is still not free from the significant
problem of racial bias, it nevertheless plays an important role in evalu-
ating police practices. Many courts, however, have erroneously inter-
preted the decisions in Garner and Graham as urging courts to resolve
the issue of reasonableness.518 This error arises from perceiving the
decisions as requiring broad deference to police officers' decisions.
One of the most important functions of the jury is to determine credi-
bility. This is particularly important when officers kill a suspect with-
out witnesses present and later justify their actions by asserting that
the suspect made a furtive gesture. Determining whether a suspect's
action was "furtive" is an extremely important jury issue because
when courts automatically defer to the officers' written assertions they
may unknowingly give the officers a license to murder at will. In this
situation, assessing credibility is essential. One scholar has further ad-
vocated the use of a jury in criminal cases to resolve Fourth Amend-
ment suppression motions. 51 9 This practice would allow juries to
reject some legal fictions easily accepted by some courts, such as the
broad searches permitted by the courts' interpretation of the search
incident to arrest doctrine. Few jurors would believe that suspects
possess unusual skills to reach guns and contraband. Yet, even if ju-
ries were to review these claims, such review would not overly deter
police practices because many jurors believe that criminal defendants
are only "second-class citizens. '520
Although some cases involving police practices can be resolved
on summary judgment when material facts are not in dispute, courts
should not infringe upon the jury's role as fact-finder when credibility
is a key issue, as it is in many police misconduct cases.
516. 42 U.S.C. 1983.
517. See supra text accompanying notes
518. See supra text accompanying notes.
519. See generally Bacigal, supra note 212.
520. Maclin, supra note 13, at 238. Juries also often fail to check the misuse of police
power because of racial prejudices. See, eg., Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of
Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. Rv.
781,784 (1994) ("Exploitation of racial fears [was] evident in the trial of the four white Los
Angeles police officers who beat Rodney King.").
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G. Justifying Preventive Actions Based on Danger vs. Justifying
Aggressive Actions Based on Danger
Although fact-finders assess danger when examining both aggres-
sive and preventive actions by police officers, danger justifying pre-
ventive actions is different from danger justifying aggressive actions.
Although danger in one context should constitute the same perception
of danger in the other context, the lower courts' interpretations of
preventive actions signify a presumption that many preventive actions
based on danger are reasonable. Such a presumption applied to ag-
gressive actions would seriously undermine the right to personal
security.
The need for a dual standard of danger is apparent when consid-
ering a fact-finder's assessment that a suspect was armed and danger-
ous, justifying a protective frisk, and the finding that the suspect was
armed, justifying the use of deadly force. When many courts deter-
mine the constitutionality of a particular frisk, they easily perceive
that the officers were in danger. For example, many courts seem to
presume that if an officer is investigating a suspect for drug posses-
sion, the officer may frisk the suspect because he is "armed and dan-
gerous." Similarly, courts have allowed officers to use incredibly
intrusive measures during Terry stops as preventive measures.
Although pointing guns at suspects should convert most stops into ar-
rests, many courts have allowed this intensive show of authority as a
preventive measure. In addition, courts have allowed officers to frisk
suspects merely because they failed to comply with the officer's com-
mand to freeze. The war on drugs has resulted in police officers hav-
ing greater preventive power to control suspects.
These same facts, however, applied in the context of aggressive
actions should not justify the use of significant force. Although many
courts fail to recognize that frisks constitute "serious intrusion[s],"52'
they should assess differently the need to strike or shoot suspects
based on similar facts. When officers act aggressively, they signifi-
cantly infringe upon the individual's constitutional right to personal
security. In this context, because of the heightened interest associated
with bodily integrity, the availability of alternative methods of appre-
hending becomes more important than in the context of preventive
actions. A suspicious movement by a suspect more readily supports a
frisk than a strike by a police officer.
521. Terry, 392 U.S. at 17.
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Although such a distinction in danger analysis may seem obvious,
the broad language that some courts use in discussing danger does not
suggest such a limitation. In determining reasonableness, courts must
consider all of the circumstances. An important circumstance in de-
termining reasonableness is the magnitude of the infringement caused
by the officer. The perception of danger is thus not an automatic justi-
fication for an aggressive action by police officers.
H. The Community Caretaking Function Doctrine Requires
Reasonable Conduct
Danger analysis has also been a significant aspect of the commu-
nity caretaking function doctrine. The doctrine by its very nature em-
phasizes that in some situations officers may avoid compliance with
the usual procedures of the Fourth Amendment in order to aid soci-
ety. Interpreted broadly, however, this doctrine can seriously under-
mine the Fourth Amendment right to personal security. The need for
a narrow scope of this doctrine is apparent when considering the mag-
istrate's ruling on the motion to suppress evidence at O.J. Simpson's
preliminary hearing.
The court held that detectives lawfully entered Mr. Simpson's
house to render aid to possible victims inside. Under this doctrine,
officers did not need probable cause to believe that someone was in
danger. They merely needed a reasonable belief that someone may be
hurt. What is reasonable in this context, however, should also depend
upon the degree of infringement on the right to personal security. If
the justification for entering a home is to save a person known to be
hurt, the balance tips in favor of entry. On the other hand, when spec-
ulation is the basis of entry, entry may still be permissible if officers do
not invoke the plain view doctrine to justify seizing items they would
not have had access to but for the entry. In that situation, the officers
truly perform an act of public service; they leave at the doorstep any
desire to investigate criminal conduct.
Although the community caretaking function and its relationship
to the exclusionary rule is a topic mandating extensive scrutiny, it is an
important piece of the courts' assessment of danger under the Fourth
Amendment. As with other doctrines, the exigencies of the day may
too often tip the balance to the side of law enforcement. The right to
personal security and privacy must also weigh heavily in assessing the
need to act as the community's caretaker.
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I. Reasonableness Requires an Actual Access Standard for Searches
Incident To Arrests
Determining what constitutes reasonable police practice is diffi-
cult. Yet when the police practice is a search incident to an arrest,
many courts have abandoned the reasonableness inquiry for a bright-
line fiction: the area in a suspect's control is the area he had access to
prior to being arrested. In doing so, courts do not require the suspect
to have actual access to the areas at the time of the search. This fic-
tion thus cuts the doctrine loose from its underlying justifications of
protecting officers, preventing escapes, and preserving evidence. The
development of this fiction underscores the need for a reasonableness
standard that seriously considers the right to personal security.
When the Court in Chimel v. California52 2" detailed the scope of
searches incident to arrests, it scrutinized the means used by the of-
ficers. The Court refused to allow officers to search an entire house
simply because the homeowner had allegedly committed a crime. In
analyzing this decision, Professor Nadine Strossen commended the
Court for its emphasis on narrowly tailored means.523 She interpreted
the decision as requiring police officers to use the least intrusive police
practice to further their reasonable concerns about safety and destruc-
tion of evidence. The decision thus signified that the Fourth Amend-
ment required scrutiny of intrusive police practices.
Through the years many courts have abandoned such scrutiny,
interpreting the progeny of Chimel as documenting the need for a
bright-line rule. That bright line became the area not in the defend-
ant's actual control, but the area where he had been prior to the
search. Although the need for bright-line rules is understandable, the
rules must have some relationship to the doctrinal justifications.
By discarding reasonableness as the standard for evaluating such
searches, some courts failed to give any weight to the right of privacy
protected by the Fourth Amendment. Such a decline in analysis can
occur when courts give broad deference to police officers' decisions
and little weight to the right to personal security. Such deference has
crept into the consideration of other preventive actions. When defer-
ence becomes routine, courts are more likely to create legal fictions-
fictions not rooted in the facts of the case nor the history of the
Amendment. Perhaps the development of the search incident to
arrest doctrine signifies the scope of the reasonableness analysis for
522. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
523. See Strossen, supra note 503.
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other Fourth Amendment doctrines if the courts fail to discard their
misperceptions. Abandoning the legal fiction associated with searches
incident to arrest is a beginning towards restoring reasonableness to it
place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
VIII. Conclusion
Dangerous misperceptions of the Fourth Amendment have seri-
ously eroded the constitutional right to personal security, a right that
protects both suspects and society from unreasonable police practices.
These misperceptions have occurred because courts have erroneously
interpreted the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of "unreasonable
searches and seizures" as raising a single question: Does the chal-
lenged police practice rationally further protecting police officers and
society from danger? By fusing the reasonableness standard with the
assessment of danger, many courts fail to understand the history of
the Fourth Amendment and the balancing of interests mandated by
the Reasonableness Clause.
The history of the Fourth Amendment reveals a mistrust of un-
checked police power. The strong deference courts grant the judg-
ments of police officers conflicts with this history of mistrust. By
failing to recognize this important historical perspective, courts have
skewed the balance of interests in favor of upholding intrusive police
practices rather than beginning the balancing process with level scales.
This pronounced deference has affected the balancing process in
numerous ways. By focusing solely on the danger a suspect represents
to police officers and society, courts often fail to discern society's in-
terest in personal security. The devaluation of this right is particularly
apparent when courts refuse to consider whether officers could have
used less intrusive means to apprehend suspects. Courts also under-
mine the right to personal security by not considering the nature of
the offense that first prompted investigation. The type of offense is
important because officers should recognize that sometimes they are
constitutionally required to let suspects go rather than use ever in-
creasing amounts of force. This highly deferential standard of review
has resulted in courts refusing to consider whether the officers' cre-
ated the need for force and deciding fact-bound cases on summary
judgment.
In determining reasonableness, courts should consider that dan-
ger is only one factor, which may be outweighed by the suspect's right
to personal security and privacy. Inherent in this balancing process is
a recognition that aggressive police actions, such as the use of force
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during arrests, are markedly different from preventive actions, such as
Terry frisks, searches incident to arrests, and community caretaking
functions. Even though preventive actions also intrude upon the right
to personal security, the perception of possible danger more easily jus-
tifies upholding a preventive action than an aggressive action. The
goal of a preventive action is to protect suspects, officers and others
from possible bodily harm; the goal of an aggressive action, however,
is to protect officers and others from possible harm by directly attack-
ing a suspect's interest in bodily integrity. Courts should thus balance
differently the need to frisk suspects for weapons and the need to
strike or shoot them. The broad language many courts use in describ-
ing the danger officers face during investigations masks this important
difference. The right to personal security deserves protection from
the courts' dangerous misperceptions of the Fourth Amendment.
